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Abstract
In the first chapter, we use detailed Danish micro-data and study how a credit-
driven boom in consumer demand affects firm dynamics. We exploit the in-
troduction of interest-only mortgages in 2003 to establish a structural break in
Danish households’ spending capacity. A difference-in-differences approach
indicates that the reform sharply increases consumers’ expenditure. This de-
mand shock generates revenues and profits for Danish firms and results in the
creation of at least 2,500 additional jobs between 2004 and 2010. These po-
sitions are concentrated in the non-tradable sector. Our results indicate that
mortgage markets shape the size and composition of real economic activity
during expansion phases.
The second chapter shows that the supply side of credit is a major factor
for hampered monetary policy transmission in monopolistic banking markets.
Our data covering all 1,555 small and medium sized banks in Germany pro-
vides a clear way to partial out demand shocks; we are thus able to show that
while market-power banks charge higher loan rates, they spare their borrow-
ers a part of exogenous monetary policy contractions and furthermore with-
hold a substantial part of rising rates from their depositors. Because high
market-power banks are relatively more profitable, these banks seem to be able
to insure their relationship-customers against adverse shocks.
In the third chapter, I develop a model where firms need to borrow the
wage bill under financial frictions. I discuss the implications of intraperiod fi-
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nancial contracts for real and financial variables in a most simple model with-
out capital. Financial variables such as the external finance premium in this
setup behave perversely. Real variables’ responses are hampered compared to
a standard Real Business Cycle model. Then, I implement intraperiod financial
contracts and show this can eliminate the problems to some extent. Financial
variables now move as observed in the data. Unlike in the original model by
Bernanke et al. (1999), the responses of real variables, especially output and
labour, however remain muted in response to a positive technology shock.
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Lay summary
During the Great Recession, millions of people across the globe lost their jobs
and homes. The bankruptcy of the American investment bank Lehman Broth-
ers in 2008 stands for the outbreak of a financial crisis which already started
evolving in 2007 and resulted in a severe global economic downturn. This high-
lights that the lives of ordinary people are very much affected by events hap-
pening in the seemingly distant financial sector. Real economic variables such
as consumption or job creation can for instance be linked to financial mar-
kets through debt provided by banks to firms and households. In this thesis,
I study some of the channels through which real business cycles, i.e. fluctu-
ations in e.g. consumption and employment over the course of time, can be
affected by shocks or frictions in the financial sector.
In the first chapter, I study, jointly with Alessia De Stefani, how rising lev-
els of household credit over the years leading up to the Great Recession may
have played a role in creating vulnerabilities in the Danish economy. Various
researchers have argued that household credit can boost demand but that the
following rise in employment is unsustainable if, for instance, workers move
from more productive to less productive sectors. Once the positive trend re-
verses, the economy is weaker than before the boom which results in many
lay-offs and a deep recession. In Denmark, a mortgage reform which tremen-
dously lowered monthly instalments left many households with extra cash on
their hands. We show that the reform is likely to have increased consumption
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but that the resulting job creation was unequally distributed across sectors. In
particular, employment expanded in less productive sectors such as services
or retail while manufacturing did not at all respond to the boost in household
consumption.
In the second chapter, I am interested in the relationship between market
power of banks and the way they charge interest rates from their borrow-
ers (i.e. households and firms) and offer them to their savers. In particular,
together with Lotta Heckmann-Draisbach, I examine if market power deter-
mines how banks pass on a shock in which the central bank raises the policy
rate. Market power signifies the extend to which a bank can charge a price
above its costs such that it can make profits. Alternatively, market power can
be measured by a bank’s importance in a geographical area compared to other
banks within the same region. I show that banks with market power charge
higher loan rates in Germany, but once the central bank raises interest rates,
these banks follow the central bank’s lead to a smaller extent. For borrowers
this means that the loan rate they need to pay does not rise as much if they
are customers of a high market-power bank. However, for savers this is detri-
mental, since the interest they get on their savings does not rise as much as it
would at a bank with lower market power.
In the third chapter, I write a theoretical model in which firms cannot pay
their workers without borrowing funds externally. To study interactions of
labour and credit markets, I completely abstract from capital and study two
versions of the financial contract. In the first version, firms can contact their
lender right after they observe a sudden improvement in economic conditions
and the contract is resolved within the same period. As this generates an unre-
alistically procyclical premium on external funds, I introduce a different timing
of the financial contract. In the second version of the model, firms need to fix
contract terms at the end of a period, before the aggregate state evolves. Inter-
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period financial contracts can generate an empirically consistent countercycli-
cal premium on external funds. However, in both versions, real variables such
as output depict a muted response compared to a model without borrowing.
This is mainly due to the sluggish response in firms’ equity.
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Chapter 1
Real effects of Relaxing Financial
Constraints for Homeowners –
Evidence from Danish Firms
Note: An earlier version of this chapter was previously published in Danmarks Na-
tionalbank Working Paper Series 2019, as WP No. 139, under the same title, and
was co-authored with Dr Alessia De Stefani who works in the Research Department
of Danmarks Nationalbank; e-mail: ads@nationalbanken.dk. The version presented
in this thesis is identical to the updated working paper which is available at SSRN:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3389943 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3389943. This
work was presented by myself during the SGPE conference in Crieff in 2019, in the
internal research seminar of Deutsche Bundesbank in 2019, at the Annual Conference
of the Scottish Economic Society in Perth in 2019, and in the internal seminar of the
School of Economics, University of Edinburgh in 2019, and in many other places by
my co-author. The data used in this chapter was accessed by Alessia through Statistics
Denmark. Danmarks Nationalbank does not bear any responsibility for the analysis
and discussion of results in this paper.
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1.1 Introduction
The events unfolding around the Global Financial Crisis have stressed how
a contraction in credit availability can drastically reduce households’ spend-
ing capacity and, through this channel, have adverse and long-lasting conse-
quences on firm-level activity (Mian et al., 2013; Mian and Sufi, 2014; Di Mag-
gio and Kermani, 2017).
Can real economic activity be traced back to credit expansions during boom
phases? History teaches us that recessions which follow credit booms tend to
be prolonged, and characterised by amplified job losses (Jordà et al., 2013, 2016;
Mian et al., 2017). Credit growth tends to be accompanied by a rise in hous-
ing valuations, to which firms often react by increasing employment levels and
prices (Di Maggio and Kermani, 2017; Stroebel and Vavra, 2019). Credit expan-
sions are also marked by an inflation of the non-tradable sector relative to the
tradable one, and by real appreciation, developments which can severely am-
plify economic downturns (Mian et al., 2020). Yet, we know very little about
the channels through which credit growth contributes to real economic activity
or to the buildup of vulnerabilities during upswings.
This chapter presents novel evidence on the extent to which financial inno-
vation can increase households’ borrowing and spending capacity and, through
this channel, spill over to the activity of firms. To pin down the mechanisms
underlying these patterns, we exploit detailed micro-data covering the entire
population of Danish households and firms, which we observe between 2004
and 2010.
This period presents several characteristics that suggest a credit-driven ex-
pansion was underway in the Danish economy. Between 2004 and 2010, mort-
gage credit and household spending expanded dramatically, and so did em-
ployment growth in the non-tradable sector (Figure 1.C.1 in Appendix 1.C).
This period is also characterised by a major innovation in the Danish mort-
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gage market: the introduction of interest-only (IO) mortgages in October 2003.
This reform allowed Danish borrowers to avoid repayment on the principal of
their mortgage for up to ten years from origination. The choice of an IO loan
thus significantly reduces monthly instalments, temporarily freeing resources
for non-housing consumption. Interest-only mortgages quickly became a mass
product, reaching about half of the outstanding mortgage stock within a cou-
ple of years (Figure 1.C.2 in Appendix 1.C).
Our results indicate that the introduction of IO loans had significant impli-
cations for real economic activity in Denmark over this time frame. We show
that the reform sharply increased Danish households’ spending capacity. This
demand shock increased revenues and profits for Danish firms and created a
significant amount of jobs, particularly in the non-tradable sector.
Our empirical analysis unfolds in two steps. We begin by estimating how
household consumption reacts to the introduction of IO mortgages. To do
so, we follow the methodology proposed by Leth-Petersen (2010) and apply
a difference-in-differences strategy based on the distribution of liquid savings
across Danish households.1 Due to higher administration margins and higher
overall interest repayments, non-amortising loans tend to be more expensive
than equivalent amortising mortgages. Thus, these loans are unlikely to appeal
equally to all households. Consumers with low levels of liquid savings relative
to their income are likely to benefit the most from the temporary reduction in
instalments granted by non-amortising loans, and they are also more likely to
use the additional liquidity to finance non-housing expenditure. Using a pro-
prietary dataset, Larsen et al. (2018) indeed find that Danish households who
choose IO loans are likely to have low levels of liquid savings to income and
to increase consumption levels after loan inception. Many of these constrained
borrowers maintain high levels of expenditure throughout the loan lifecycle,
1Leth-Petersen (2010) studies the behaviour of Danish consumers in the aftermath of an-
other mortgage reform, the introduction of home-equity lines of credit in 1992.
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to the point that some of them are forced to cut spending once amortisation
begins (Andersen et al., 2019).
We find that on average liquidity-constrained homeowners significantly
shift their consumption after the reform, compared to a similar group of non-
liquidity-constrained households.2 This effect occurs only after 2003 and is not
driven by housing wealth, or other time-varying shocks affecting differentially
the two groups of homeowners. Our estimates indicate that, for the average
Danish homeowner, the increase in yearly expenditure is worth up to DKK
10,900 (or USD 2,000), at peak. A simple back of the envelope calculation in-
dicates that the aggregate demand effect amounts to at least DKK 15 billion
(USD 2 billion), or 2% of household expenditure levels in 2002.
In the second step, we estimate how this spending shock affects firm dy-
namics. To do so, we develop a panel dataset that links all establishments
operating in the country to their parent firms and municipality. Geographi-
cal identifiers allow us to link regional spending shocks to the activity of lo-
cal firms. To address endogeneity between household expenditure and firm-
level outcomes, we employ an instrumental variable strategy. We develop a
municipality-based, time-varying measure of the consumption shift originat-
ing from the reform, inspired by Bartik (1991) instruments. This variable is
constructed as the interaction between the expenditure response of the aver-
age homeowner at any given point in time, estimated in the first step, and the
number of liquidity-constrained homeowners living in a given municipality
in 2002. This instrument is based on a simple intuition: municipalities which
hosted a higher number of liquidity-constrained households before 2003 are
likely to be subject to larger demand shocks, following the introduction of IO
loans.
2Bäckman and Khorunzhina (2020) use an empirical approach similar to ours and show
that Danish consumers who had larger housing wealth relative to their income in 2002 react
to the introduction of IO loans by increasing their expenditure levels, after the reform.
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Our most conservative estimates indicate that for a 10% increase in con-
sumer expenditure, Danish firms experience a 0.2% increase in revenues and
profits, within the same year. Firms react to this demand shock by increasing
employment by a similar margin, albeit we register no significant short-run
effect on investment. These results are robust to controlling for several ex-ante
characteristics of regions, time-varying house price shocks, and aggregate dy-
namics.
The granularity of the data allows us also to address a major identification
challenge: separating the role of local demand from the effect of a shift in credit
supply to firms. The IO reform could, potentially, increase firms’ borrowing
capacity and thus drive the firm-level outcomes directly. To address this issue,
we include firm-by-year fixed effects, thus relying only on cross-establishment
variation within a given firm and year. Given that credit lines are negotiated
at the firm level, this strategy allows us to isolate the role of local demand.
A regionally-weighted back-of-the-envelope calculation based on our most
conservative estimates suggests that the introduction of IO loans accounts for
the creation of at least 2,500 jobs between 2004 and 2010.
The shift in demand expands revenues, profits and employment in non-
tradable firms and sectors, but not in tradable ones. In line with earlier litera-
ture (Mian et al., 2020), we interpret this finding as suggesting that firm activity
was driven by local demand, rather than by an improvement in the local econ-
omy’s productive capacity. Expansions driven by household demand tend
to reverse more quickly during downturns and expose economies to longer-
lasting recessions (Jordà et al., 2016; Mian et al., 2020).
A second potential negative spillover of a relative expansion of the non-
tradable sector tends to be real appreciation: rising labour demand may drive
up wages above productivity levels and reduce the competitiveness of local
exporters (Mian et al., 2020). However, we find no significant effect of the
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demand shock on changes in wages across Danish firms. Consistently, we
measure no significant changes in labour productivity, or in the trade balance.
Albeit these results cannot speak to aggregate changes in wages or competi-
tiveness, this evidence is indicative that real appreciation is likely to have been
less severe in Denmark than in other countries (Mian et al., 2020). Possibly, this
difference can be explained through the prevalence of collective bargaining
systems in the Danish labour market, which may have played a role in keep-
ing wages aligned across the country, and in check with productivity growth.
Our main contribution is to highlight the real effects of a credit-induced
expansion in consumer demand. We provide evidence that mortgage markets
have the power to shape the size and composition of economies during an ex-
pansion phase. Most of the existing literature has focused on the Great Reces-
sion, either by estimating the real implications of the credit crunch (Mian et al.,
2013; Mian and Sufi, 2014; Di Maggio and Kermani, 2017; Garcia, 2020), or by
showing how countercyclical monetary policy transmits to household spend-
ing via the structure of the outstanding mortgage stock (Di Maggio et al., 2017;
Cumming, 2018; Luck and Zimmermann, 2020).
So far, there is very little evidence about the role of mortgage credit in
shaping real economic outcomes during an expansion phase. One exception
is Mian et al. (2020), who show how credit market deregulation in the US gen-
erates regional booms which increase the size of the non-tradable sector and
predict more severe contractions in economic activity, ex-post. This chapter
complements their results in several ways. First, Mian et al. (2020) rely on an
indirect measure of consumption, credit growth at the regional level. Instead,
we observe household spending directly and can therefore estimate elasticities
of firm-level outcomes to consumption. Methodologically, the granularity of
our data allows us to shut down many potential confounders, such as the di-
rect effects of credit expansion on firms. Furthermore, a general credit market
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deregulation can affect consumer demand through many channels, including,
for example house price growth (Di Maggio and Kermani, 2017). We identify
a cash-flow effect on consumption that would be active even in absence of a
significant change in house prices.
Finally, we also draw inspiration from the vast applied literature which
has emerged in recent years, assessing how household consumption reacts to
innovations in mortgage markets and house prices (Hurst and Stafford, 2004;
Leth-Petersen, 2010; Mian and Sufi, 2011; Paiella and Pistaferri, 2017; Kaplan
et al., 2016; Andersen et al., 2016; Aladangady, 2017; Jensen and Johannesen,
2017; Larsen et al., 2018; Andersen et al., 2019).
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 briefly describes our data
sources. Section 1.3 provides some institutional context and describes our em-
pirical approach. Section 1.4 outlines how household spending shifted in the
aftermath of the IO reform and section 1.5 estimates the effects of this spending
shock on firm activity. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Data
The data used in this chapter stems from several administrative registries cov-
ering the entire population of households and firms living and operating in
Denmark. These are collected and administered by Statistics Denmark.
1.2.1 Individuals, households and consumption imputation
Each person who is tax liable in the country can be identified in the individual
registries through an anonymised version of CPR number, the Danish equiva-
lent of social security numbers. This number can be used to match the popula-
tion registries to their income, taxes, wealth and the balance sheet components
across registries. Data on income and assets comes directly from the Central
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Customs and Tax Administration (SKAT) and is available on an annual basis.
Individuals can be mapped to households, defined as one adult or two
adults co-habiting plus dependent children. Household-level income and bal-
ance sheets can be used to impute annual household expenditure, defined as
the sum of disposable income minus changes in net wealth, following the work
of Browning and Leth-Petersen (2003), Browning et al. (2013), Leth-Petersen
(2010), Andersen et al. (2016) and Hviid and Kuchler (2017). We define dis-
posable income as the sum of wage income, capital income and social benefits
minus taxes, alimony payments and tax-exempted interest expenses on mort-
gages and student loans.3 The change in net wealth consists of net income from
pension schemes as well as the change in stock assets and deposits from the
previous to the current year-end, respectively. Changes in deposits include not
only changes in cash holdings but also evolution in the market value of bonds
and mortgage deeds from one year to the next. The latter aims at approximat-
ing payments on mortgage debt which are to be deducted from disposable in-
come when imputing consumption. Payments on other forms of bank debt are
similarly calculated as the yearly change in a household’s outstanding debt.4
A general caveat of the procedure is that changes in asset prices affect im-
puted consumption, even though asset revaluations might not affect actual
spending. The data does not allow us to distinguish between changes in net
wealth due to innovations in stock prices and realised capital gains or losses
from trading activities. For example, if a household invests in stocks, this
decision will correctly reduce spending in that year, all else held equal; but
imputed expenditure will also decline when the price of existing stocks in-
creases, in absence of any active investment behaviour. However, Jensen and
3The definition of disposable income also includes the calculated rental value of own hous-
ing. However, we deduct this again when imputing household spending.
4Since data on private pension savings is unavailable before 1999, we exclude private pen-
sion contributions from our consumption imputation. The imputation of consumption with
and without pension savings is substantially different for self-employed workers, which we
therefore exclude from the sample.
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Johannesen (2017) ensure that adding changes in the general stock market in-
dex back into imputed consumption, or excluding all stock owners from the
sample, does not make a substantial difference for imputed consumption over
the period 2003–2011. To prevent an analogous bias arising from changes in
house values, we exclude housing assets from the imputation just as Brown-
ing et al. (2013), Leth-Petersen (2010), Jensen and Johannesen (2017) and Hviid
and Kuchler (2017).
Another potential bias stemming from the imputation procedure relates
to the measurement of mortgage debt. In Denmark, mortgages are funded
through callable bonds, issued by mortgage credit institutions. Bonds match
the maturity of the loan, and interest rates are determined by market rates
rather than by the lending bank. Mortgages can be refinanced at any time by
the borrowers, by buying the underlying bond(s) at par and issuing a new one.
In this institutional setting, a drop in market rates generally increases the out-
standing bond value, for fixed-rate mortgage (FRM) holders. Since we only
observe the market value of the underlying bond in our data, a drop in mar-
ket rates would induce a mechanic reduction in net wealth for FRM borrowers
and increase their imputed expenditure, even if actual household spending re-
mained unchanged. However, market rates remained stable until the end of
2005, after which they gradually rose until the fourth quarter of 2008.5 Further-
more, adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) are naturally unaffected by changes
in market rates and the share of ARMs rose significantly over this time frame
(Larsen et al., 2018).
We restrict our estimations to a balanced panel of households continu-
ally observed between 1996 and 2010. We exclude self-employed people and
households who change tenure status at any point during this time frame
(switching from renting to owning, or vice versa) as the expenditure impu-
5See e.g. http://www.nationalbanken.dk/en/marketinfo/official_
interestrates/Pages/Default.aspx, viewed 12 February 2020.
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tation for these categories of consumers is not reliable (Leth-Petersen, 2010).
As a result, our sample is composed of homeowners who remained home-
owners between 2002 and 2010, or equivalent renters. Finally, we limit the
sample to households in which the eldest person must be at least 24 and younger
than 66 in order to study the decisions independent from extreme life-cycle dy-
namics.
1.2.2 Firms and establishments
The Central Business Register (CVR, Det Centrale Virksomhedsregister), owned
by the Danish Business Authority (Erhvervsstyrelsen), assigns each legal entity
in Denmark a unique (anonymised) identifier (CVR Number). For each firm
we observe detailed balance sheet information at an annual frequency as well
as the count of employees (in full-time equivalent) and sector of operation. We
exclude firms without any employees at the end of the year (sole proprietors)
and firms with balance sheets that originate in part or in total from imputa-
tion procedures. Other than these exclusions, we work with the entirety of
employer firms operating in Denmark between 2004 and 2010.
We link firms (i.e. headquarters) to all of their establishments (i.e. plants/
workplaces) and location (municipality) of operation. We collect information
on the revenues, profits, employment and investment for each firm as well as
each establishment. If a firm is a single-establishment firm, the firm and estab-
lishment are by definition identical. We mostly rely on firm-level information,
since this data is readily available for all firms and allows us to distinguish
between real and imputed balance sheets.
The registry-based data matches reasonably well the aggregate figures on
the number of firms provided by Statistics Denmark in any given year and its
trend over time. We observe that the number of employer firms (i.e active firms
with at least one employee, excluding self employed entrepreneurs) is lower
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than the aggregate figures by about 5,000 units out of 120,000, a difference
that is roughly consistent across the years (Figure 1.C.3 in Appendix 1.C). This
is explained by the fact that our data excludes financial companies and firms
active in the agricultural sector. The year 2009, however, shows a discontinuity,
which can be attributed to the change in definition of non-employer firms for
the purpose of compiling aggregate statistics in the year 2008.
1.3 Background and empirical approach
This section presents background information on the IO reform in Denmark,
its expected effect on consumption, and the empirical methodology.
1.3.1 Interest-only mortgages in Denmark
Denmark experienced a major mortgage reform in 2003. From the first of Octo-
ber, interest-only mortgages were made available to the public, allowing cur-
rent and prospective homeowners to delay payment towards the principal of
their mortgage for up to ten years. This mortgage typology quickly became
very popular: the market value of outstanding IO mortgages accounted for
close to half of total mortgage volume already in 2006 and has remained fairly
stable ever since (Figure 1.C.2 in Appendix 1.C).
Interest-only mortgages can significantly reduce initial debt-servicing costs
compared to canonical amortising mortgages.6 As a result, not only these loans
facilitate access to the housing market for new buyers, but, through a refinanc-
ing channel, can also alleviate monthly repayments for existing homeowners.
However, they tend to carry higher costs than an equivalent amortising loan:
this is due to higher administration margins and to higher overall interest re-
payments, since for the first ten years the outstanding principal remains un-
6Currently, an ARM IO mortgage reduces initial monthly instalments by about 75%, com-
pared to an amortising loan of the same size and maturity.
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changed.
Thus, IO loans should appeal mainly to households for whom it seems op-
timal to defer amortization to the future, such as those bound by temporary
liquidity constraints. Indeed, Larsen et al. (2018) leverage a proprietary dataset
to document that uptake of IO mortgages in Denmark is prevalent among
young consumers, who are likely to expect a steep income growth path; or
older hand-to-mouth households. They show that IO borrowers do not tend to
store the additional liquidity in savings but rather increase expenditure, which
suggests a consumption smoothing motive.7
This behaviour is consistent with a simple life-cycle model where a fraction
of households is liquidity constrained. Since these households are not con-
strained by lifecycle wealth but rather by current income, they do not optimise
intertemporarily and hence always consume their entire budget.8 In contrast
to a standard consumption savings model without such households, even tem-
porary gains in disposable income which are to be followed by higher costs in
the future translate into higher consumption. In Appendix 1.A, we present in
detail a stylised model which is closely related to Galı́ et al. (2007) who study
the impact of a temporary increase in government spending on consumption.
We make some crucial alterations and incorporate borrowing into the model.
In particular, we assume that each period liquidity constrained households
can borrow funds and show that a temporary relaxation of credit (and thus
liquidity) constraints will immediately generate a positive response in aggre-
gate consumption. Furthermore, the magnitude of the shift in consumption
depends positively on the number of constrained households in the economy.
7However, a significant fraction of Danish IO borrowers do not fully smooth consumption
over the loan lifecycle and as a result they are forced to significantly cut expenditure, once the
loan resets (Andersen et al., 2019).
8For early work on life-cycle models with liquidity constraints, see Dolde (1978); Muell-
bauer (1983); Alessie et al. (1997).
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1.3.2 Effect of the reform on consumption: Identification
Household debt and expenditure increased significantly in Denmark after 2003
(Figure 1.C.1 in Appendix 1.C). In assessing how the mortgage reform affected
these developments, we are faced with a limitation: our dataset does not con-
tain information on the loan typology held by individual households. Thus,
we follow the methodology adopted by Leth-Petersen (2010), who studies how
Danish consumers reacted to a different mortgage reform: the introduction of
home equity loans in 1992.
Leth-Petersen (2010) uses the ratio of liquid savings to income right before
the 1992 reform was announced as a proxy for the likelihood to use home eq-
uity loans and shows that constrained households significantly increase spend-
ing in the subsequent years. Consumers with low levels of liquidity ex-ante
should be generally more likely to use a mortgage product that provides them
with higher levels of liquidity ex-post, like IO loans. Our theoretical frame-
work predicts that access to additional liquidity should induce household con-
sumption to increase.
Hence, we split our sample of homeowners into two groups, based on
their ex-ante liquid savings-to-income ratios. Homeowners are allocated to the
liquidity-constrained (treatment) group if they have less than 1.5 months of a
year’s disposable income stored in liquid assets at the end of 2002, the year be-
fore the reform was announced. Otherwise, they enter the control group.9 We
choose this specific threshold to be consistent with the existing literature (Leth-
Petersen, 2010) and to obtain common support between the two groups, since
this value splits our sample roughly half (Figure 1.C.4 in Appendix 1.C). This
threshold is also highly correlated with IO ownership, measured ex-post.10
9Liquid assets are defined as the sum of stocks, bonds and bank deposits held at year-end.
10We observe the typology of mortgage holdings only starting in 2009, through the mortgage
registry. The relationship between liquid savings to income in 2002 and IO mortgage holdings
in 2009 is highly non-linear; up to two months of income held as liquid savings, the correlation
is strongly positive and declines afterwards (Figure 1.C.5 in Appendix 1.C).
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Homeowners in the control group may have been affected by the reform as
well, but we rely on the intuition that for constrained homeowners the treat-
ment probability, or IO uptake, is larger. Also, constrained households with an
IO mortgage should experience greater treatment intensity, or consumption re-
sponse, due to their higher marginal propensities to consume out of additional
liquidity.11
The identifying assumption is that assignment to the respective group, in
this case the share of liquid savings to income, is exogenous to the reform.
This assumption would be violated if people self-assigned into treatment, by
adjusting their saving rates already in 2002 in anticipation of the mortgage
reform. However, the bill regarding IO mortgages was first debated in Parlia-
ment only in the spring of 2003, and subsequently approved in June. Hence,
an anticipation effect seems unlikely.











= α0 + α1Dh,2002 + α2Xh,2002 +
ψm + εh ∀k ∈ {1, ..., 7}
(1.1)
where Y s define outcome variables for household h in year t, such as house-
hold expenditure or debt. In line with Leth-Petersen (2010), we use expanding
averages of differences in outcomes. In particular,
∑k
i=1 Yh,2003+k is the sum of a
given household-level outcome over k years after the reform and
∑k
i=1 Yh,2003−k
the respective sum over k years preceding the reform. This difference is then
divided by the number of years, k. The year 2003 is excluded, thus resulting in
a set of seven different yearly outcomes for every Yh.12
11Kaplan et al. (2014) show that consumption of households with low levels of liquid assets
is more responsive to transitory income changes.
12For each k on household-level, the dependent variable is calculated as:
for k = 1 : Yh,2004 − Yh,2002,
for k = 2 : [(Yh,2005 + Yh,2004)− (Yh,2002 + Yh,2001)]/2,
for k = 3 : [(Yh,2006 +Yh,2005 +Yh,2004)− (Yh,2002 +Yh,2001 +Yh,2000)]/3, etc., up until k = 7.
26
Expanding averages help removing noise from imputation procedures, as
year-on-year changes often exhibit discrete jumps (Leth-Petersen, 2010). Fur-
thermore, this procedure takes into account that the effect of IO uptake on
expenditure is likely to have been smoothed over a number of years.
In all estimations, the treatment indicatorDh,2002 takes value one if a house-
hold was liquidity-constrained in 2002, and zero otherwise. For each k, α1
estimates the average effect of the IO reform on the change in outcomes of
liquidity-constrained vis-à-vis unconstrained households. The sequence of
α1’s then yields a time-varying average reform effect, spanning over the years
2004-2010.
We condition on a set of ex-ante household characteristics: age, income,
family composition and house value, captured in the vector Xh,2002, and in-
clude municipality fixed effects, ψm.13 While the inclusion of individual-level
characteristics aims at comparing similar households across the two groups,
the fixed effects rule out that time-invariant regional characteristics may cause
them to react differently to the same reform.
Naturally, constrained and unconstrained households might have been dif-
ferently exposed to other time-varying shocks after 2003. To mitigate these
concerns, we run a number of placebo tests.
1.3.3 Impact of household consumption on firm dynamics: Iden-
tification
To link the behaviour of households to the decisions of firms, we exploit ge-
ographical variation in the magnitude of the spending shock across Danish
municipalities.14
13We follow Leth-Petersen (2010) and choose ex-ante values of the household characteristics
because their evolution ex-post could be affected by the reform. In a robustness test, we control
for their contemporaneous equivalents.
14In doing so, we follow a strand of applied literature which estimates firms’ response to
shocks in household demand. For examples of recent contributions, see Giroud and Mueller
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The baseline equation, aimed at measuring how regional spending shocks
affect local firms, is expressed as follows:
log(Yifmt) = β0 + β1log(Cmt) + θf + φt + εifmt (1.2)
where Yifmt measures a given outcome, such as revenues, profits or em-
ployment, for establishment i, located in municipalitym and belonging to firm
f , at the end of year t.15 The variable Cmt is the municipality-level sum of
imputed household consumption at the end of year t.16 To account for the
skewed distribution in both dependent variables and consumption levels, we
log-linearise both sides of this equation. This choice allows us to interpret β1
as an elasticity. Firm fixed effects, θf , account for time-invariant characteristics
of firms and reduce this estimation to a model in changes. Year fixed effects,
φt, capture the effect of aggregate macroeconomic shocks. We cluster standard
errors at the municipality-level, to take into account correlation in error terms
across firms operating in the same city over time.
This model effectively compares changes in outcomes as firms are exposed
to differential demand shocks in the same year, resembling a difference-in-
differences approach. However, Equation (1.2) is subject to numerous crit-
icisms. To begin with, the direction of causality is unclear. For instance, a
positive shock to labour productivity in a particular sector may increase em-
ployment and wages and thus lead to higher consumption in regions where
these sectors are prevalent. Likewise, regional consumption and employment
may be simultaneously affected by numerous regional time-varying shocks,
such as rising public investment, expectations, or credit conditions.
(2018) or Di Maggio and Kermani (2017).
15For most estimations, we rely on firm-level data, as this is a more reliable data source.
Thus i=f .
16Currently there are 98 municipalities in Denmark, following a reform in 2007 that reduced
their number from the 270 before the reform. Since some municipalities were merged and
others were split, we assign households and firms to the new municipality codes based on the
municipality code assigned to the individual building after 2007.
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To address these concerns, we employ an instrumental variable strategy, by
developing a measure of reform-driven spending which varies across munici-
palities and over time.
We define the instrument as follows:
Spendingmt = α1,2003+k ∗Nm,2002 (1.3)
where α1,2003+k measures the average increase in consumption for liquid-
ity constrained homeowners in each year between 2004 and 2010, estimated
by Equation (1.1). Nm,2002 is the number of liquidity-constrained homeown-
ers living in a municipality at the end of 2002, the year before the reform was
announced.17
The intuition behind this measure is simple: municipalities that hosted a
larger number of liquidity-constrained homeowners before the reform should
experience a more pronounced increase in household expenditure after 2003.
At the same time, the measure is pre-determined and cannot be affected by
the evolution of local firm dynamics after the reform. Thus, Spendingmt is a
regional, time-varying measure of the change in consumption occurring after
the reform, resembling a Bartik instrument (Bartik, 1991). The main difference
with a standard Bartik instrument is that by interacting the average spending
effect with the number of liquidity-constrained homeowners, we rely on ex-
ante cross-regional variation in levels, rather than shares. However, this choice
stems naturally from the fact that the estimated shifts in consumption (i.e. the
α1’s from Equation (1.1)) measure changes in average household-level expendi-
ture as opposed to a regional aggregate.18
17Figure 1.C.6 in Appendix 1.C depicts the variation in the number of constrained home-
owners across Danish municipalities in 2002.
18To provide a numerical example, the number of constrained homeowners living in Copen-
hagen in 2002, for whom we have observations in every year afterwards and who never
bought, sold or moved, is 12,100. Hence, Spending for the municipality of Copenhagen in
2004 is the product of the aggregate household-level effect as measured by α1 for 2004 (i.e.
DKK 5,100), multiplied by 12,100 which gives roughly DKK 62 million (USD 10 million).
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The first-stage and second-stage equations are defined as follows:
log(Cmt) = γ0+γ1log(Spendingmt)+γ3Xm,2002+γ4HPm,t−1+θf+φt+vifmt (1.4)
log(Yifmt) = β0 + β1 ̂log(Cmt) + β3Xm,2002 + β4HPm,t−1 + θf + φt + uifmt (1.5)
where γ1 in Equation (1.4) captures the relevance of the instrument, or the
relationship between Spendingmt and aggregate household consumption in a
given municipality and year, Cmt. Yifmt in Equation (1.5) represents firm or
establishment-level outcomes, such as revenues, profits, investment and em-
ployment. The coefficient of interest is β1, which measures the effect of aggre-
gate regional consumption on firm dynamics.
The identifying assumption requires Spendingmt to be orthogonal to un-
observed firm and municipality-level characteristics that affect establishment-
level outcomes directly. In other words, for the instrument to be valid, the
interaction between the ex-ante number of constrained homeowners residing
in a given municipality and average yearly spending increase needs to have
an effect on firms solely through its effect on consumption.
A potential concern with this approach is that the number of constrained
homeowners, Nm,2002, is unlikely to be randomly distributed across the terri-
tory. This measure is likely to be correlated with other municipality character-
istics that could drive firm activity directly, such as population size, or income
levels. Also, the effect of a given demand shock is likely to depend negatively
on the ex-ante aggregate levels of consumption in the region, as its relative
impact will be comparatively smaller. These level effects are also likely to be
correlated with the number of liquidity-constrained homeowners.
To address these issues, we control for a set of ex-ante municipality char-
acteristics.19 The vector Xm,2002 includes population size, the average ratio of
19Including the number of liquidity-constrained homeowners or municipality fixed effects
would leave us with no variation, since we log-linearise the interaction term Spendingmt.
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liquid assets to income among locals and aggregate household consumption,
all measured in 2002. The inclusion of these variables allows us to measure
how a relative change in expenditure affects firms operating in regions of sim-
ilar size, where the population has comparable characteristics and exhibited
similar pre-reform consumption levels.
Another potential confounder is appreciation in property values, which
could simultaneously drive consumption, revenues and employment within
the region.20 To address this issue, we control for lagged house price changes
at the municipality level, HPm,t−1.21
Firms with different characteristics may also be distributed differently across
municipalities. For instance, relatively poorer regions could be simultaneously
characterised by a higher number of constrained households and a dominant
presence of large grocery stores. In richer regions, smaller owner-run corner
shops could instead be prevalent. If these two types of stores reacted differ-
ently to local changes in demand, for example due to their differential hiring
capacity, the instrument would capture the role of unobserved firm charac-
teristics. The inclusion of firm fixed effects, however, largely mitigates this
concern by controlling for their time-invariant characteristics.
Year fixed effects, φt, ensure that our estimates do not capture aggregate
shocks, such as macroeconomic policy, or business cycle variation.
The inclusion of these controls aims at insuring the validity of the exclu-
sion restriction: Spendingmt can be considered a valid instrument only after
partialling out ex-ante regional or firm-level differences and various shocks
in fundamentals. Under the assumption that the exclusion restriction holds,
our IV estimation yields an elasticity of establishment outcomes to changes in
20Consumption and employment are jointly explained by negative shocks to housing net
worth (Mian and Sufi, 2014).
21The house price index is based on sales of residential properties. It is computed as the
change in the average price/sqm in a given municipality between the fourth quarter of a year
and four quarters before.
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consumer demand.
The validity of Spendingmt as an instrument implies a parallel-trends as-
sumption: the number of liquidity constrained homeowners should affect con-
sumption and firm-level outcomes only after 2003, and not before. Figure 1.C.7
and Figure 1.C.8 in Appendix 1.C suggest that this assumption is not violated.
1.4 Results: Household expenditure after 2003
Table 1.1 presents the estimates of Equation (1.1), aimed at retrieving how
the expenditure of liquidity constrained homeowners changes vis-à-vis uncon-
strained ones in the post-reform period.
Columns 1–3 in Table 1.1 show that up to 2002, expenditure growth in our
treatment group was consistently lower than in the control group, with no
significant pre-trends.22
After 2003, this pattern reverses. The coefficients in columns 4–10 of Ta-
ble 1.1 depict the seven α1’s in Equation (1.1), for each year between 2004 and
2010. The relative change in annual expenditure between 2002 and 2004 is
DKK 5,100 (roughly USD 780) higher for constrained homeowners than for
non-constrained ones (column 4). Assigning placebo treatment years verifies
that this relative increase in expenditure occurs only after 2003, the year in
which interest-only mortgages were introduced.23
The consumption of liquidity-constrained homeowners vis-à-vis the con-
trol group rises progressively over the years, up to DKK 10,900 (USD 1,650)
in 2007 and then fades out through the crisis and recession years. In 2010, the
22These pre-reform measures are defined as the averages of expenditure changes over two
years. For example, ∆C2002 = [(Yh,2002 +Yh,2001)−(Yh,2000 +Yh,1999)]/2 andC2001 = [(Yh,2001 +
Yh,2000)− (Yh,1999 +Yh,1998)]/2. We can only impute expenditure as far back as 1997, hence we
are unable to take average changes over a longer time horizon, or expand the averages further.
23In Table 1.B.1 in Appendix 1.B, we define three placebo treatment years (1998, 1999, 2000)
and assign households into treatment and control groups according to their liquid assets to
income-ratio at the time. Regressing average expenditure changes on the placebo treatment














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































effect amounts to only DKK 1,300 (USD 200).
These results show that the treatment group enters a relatively steeper con-
sumption growth path compared to the control group, exactly in correspon-
dence with the introduction of IO mortgages. Nevertheless, liquidity-con-
strained homeowners could have been subject to other time varying shocks
than the IO reform, after 2003. We now turn to ruling out some of these poten-
tial confounders.
While liquidity-constrained homeowners are more indebted already before
the reform, they lever up to a substantially larger extent in its aftermath, sup-
porting the notion that growth in consumption was accompanied by a signifi-
cant development in mortgage credit uptake (Table 1.B.2 in Appendix 1.B).
The spending and leverage effects could, however, also stem from differ-
ential income paths of liquidity-constrained versus unconstrained homeown-
ers. Yet, we do not observe a relatively steeper growth path in disposable
income within the constrained group, compared to the control (Table 1.B.4 in
Appendix 1.B).24 Similarly, the consumption effect holds to controlling for con-
temporaneous evolutions in disposable income, wealth and life-cycle dynam-
ics (Table 1.B.5 in Appendix 1.B).
A potential further concern relates to other policy changes enacted around
2003, which could drive up the expenditure of liquidity-constrained house-
holds. For example, Denmark passed a major tax reform in 2004, which re-
duced labour income taxation, particularly on lower income brackets. To stave
off the concern that a reduction in tax rates could be the main driver of the
expenditure shift we observe among liquidity-constrained homeowners, we
estimate Equation (1.1) on renters. Like in the case of homeowners, liquidity-
24Exclusively in 2004, 2005 and 2006, liquidity-constrained homeowners experience an in-
crease in disposable income vis-à-vis unconstrained ones (Table 1.B.4 in Appendix 1.B). How-
ever, the gains are only a fraction of the shifts in consumption in the respective years, in ab-
solute terms (Table 1.1). Therefore, a shock to disposable income together with higher MPCs
among the treatment group could not drive the consumption shifts alone.
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constrained renters are likely to benefit comparatively more from the tax re-
form, as this is likely to increase their disposable income and thus reduce
their liquidity constraints. If the tax reform was the real driver of the change
in homeowners’ spending patterns after 2003, we should observe a change
in consumption among liquidity-constrained renters as well. On the other
hand, renters’ expenditure cannot be directly affected by the IO reform, in-
dependently of their degree of liquidity constraints.25 In the pre-reform pe-
riod, liquidity-constrained renters increase consumption less than the control
group, consistently with the results on homeowners (Table 1.B.6 in Appendix
1.B). However, unlike in the case of homeowners, we observe no changes in
expenditure trends between the two groups of renters after 2003 (Table 1.B.6
in section 1.B). This evidence suggests that the tax reform is unlikely to drive
the expenditure changes we observe among homeowners, over the same time
frame.
Finally, housing wealth effects could play a role, since liquidity-constrained
homeowners may benefit more than others from the growth in house prices
occurring over this time frame. However, house valuations do not grow dif-
ferentially between the two groups of homeowners, suggesting that wealth ef-
fects are unlikely to be the main driver of the change in expenditure behaviour
(Table 1.B.3 in Appendix 1.B).26
A more fundamental concern relates to differential MPCs across the treat-
ment and control group. Liquidity-constrained households might display a
greater reaction both to idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks, since they are
likely to have higher marginal propensities to consume. Obtaining informa-
tion about the actual timing of IO uptake would not be sufficient to entirely
erase this concern: mortgage typology is a choice variable in itself, possibly
25As discussed in section 1.2, we exclude households who change tenure status over this
time frame, including renters who become homeowners.
26Furthermore, the expenditure effect holds to controlling for contemporaneous changes in
housing valuation. See Table 1.B.5 in Appendix 1.B.
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led by differential MPCs. To fully address this issue, we would need quasi-
random assignment into IO loans around the time of their introduction.
We acknowledge this fundamental limitation posed by our empirical ap-
proach. Nevertheless, we believe that our results provide reasonable evidence
in support of the claim that the spending shock we estimate is predominantly
driven by the introduction of IO mortgages. First, we document a sharp in-
crease in expenditure and leverage among liquidity-constrained homeowners
in the immediate aftermath of this major mortgage reform. Second, the only
other policy change we are aware of, the income tax reform in 2004, should
affect liquidity-constrained renters as well. However, we observe no relative
change in consumption paths for renters. Third, the effects are not explained
by changes in individual observables, such as income or house price growth.27
Finally, our findings are consistent with the results presented by Larsen et al.
(2018) who, through a proprietary dataset, observe the actual timing of IO
mortgage uptake in a large sample of Danish borrowers. They find that more
constrained households increase leverage and expenditure after choosing this
loan typology. Our results are qualitatively and quantitatively in line with
theirs.
A simple back-of the envelope approach can provide an indication of the
aggregate spending shock resulting from this event.
Multiplying the average yearly spending change estimated in Table 1.1 by
the number of liquidity-constrained homeowners living in Denmark in 2002
yields an aggregate spending increase worth up to DKK 3.5 billion per year, at
peak (Figure 1.C.9 in Appendix 1.C). The sum of these yearly spending shocks
amounts to almost DKK 15 billion over the entire time frame, or about 2%
of aggregate household consumption in 2002. These estimates are likely to
27In addition, the placebo test in Table 1.B.1 in Appendix 1.B includes a period of mild house
price growth, between of 2000 and 2001, but we not observe constrained homeowners’ con-
sumption to rise relative to the control group.
36
underestimate the true spending shock originating from the introduction of IO
mortgages, for many reasons. First, we exclude households who switched into
homeownership after the reform. These consumers probably reduced their
cash-flow housing expenditure with respect to renting a similar housing unit,
and therefore might have increased non-housing consumption. Furthermore,
we disregard any general equilibrium effects originating, for example, from
the effect of the reform on house prices.
1.5 Results: Firm-level outcomes
This section outlines how firm dynamics react to changes in household de-
mand.
1.5.1 Baseline results
Table 1.2 presents the estimation of Equation (1.2), showing how regional house-
hold expenditure correlates with the financial and real outcomes of firms op-
erating in the same municipality. Revenues, profits and employment rise to-
gether with spending levels (columns 1–3), albeit we register no significant
correlation with investment, measured as gross-fixed capital formation (col-
umn 4).28
Since the correlations in Table 1.2 are likely to be spurious, in Table 1.3 we
implement the instrumental variable strategy described in Equations (1.4) and
(1.5). The first-stage results show that the instrument, Spendingmt, has a signif-
icant effect on aggregate household expenditure, measured at the municipality
level, Cmt (column 1).29
28In Table 1.B.7 in Appendix 1.B, we include control variables sequentially in order to assess
their relative importance.
29To the extent that the instrument is a strong predictor of aggregate consumption and that
consumption is related to firm-level outcomes, we should also observe a relationship in the
reduced-form equation. Table 1.B.8 in Appendix 1.B ensures that this is the case.
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Table 1.2: Aggregate spending and firm-level outcomes: OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Revenues Profits Employment Investment
Firm Firm Firm Firm
VARIABLES OLS OLS OLS OLS
log(Cmt) 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.014*** -0.022
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.020)
HPricem,t−1 -0.017*** -0.009** -0.014** 0.014
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.015)
Popm,2002 0.031** 0.036** 0.050*** -0.093*
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.049)
Liqu./Incomem,2002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.008
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.011)
log(Cm,2002) -0.051*** -0.056*** -0.068*** 0.110*
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.058)
Observations 409,847 408,676 409,987 409,898
R-squared 0.987 0.979 0.984 0.674
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: Data from Statistics Denmark, 2004-2010. Notes: The dependent variables are firm-
level end-year log-linearised values of: revenues (col.1), profits (col.2), full-time equiva-
lents (col.3), gross fixed-capital formation (col. 4). log(Cmt) measures aggregate household
expenditure in a given municipality and year, measured as the sum of imputed consump-
tion for all resident households. Municipality-level house price growth, HPricem,t−1, is
measured as the change in the average sale price per sqm. Popm,2002 counts the number
of individuals living in the municipality in 2002; Liqu./Incomem,2002 measures the aver-
age liquid-asset-to-income ratio in the resident population in 2002; log(Cm,2002) measures
aggregate consumption levels in 2002. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the
municipality-level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
The second stage estimation shows the elasticity of response of firm activ-
ity to household expenditure. On average, given a 10% increase in regional
household expenditure, local firms experience a 0.2% increase in revenues and
profits (columns 2 and 3, respectively). We also observe significant effects on
employment, as the number of full-time equivalents rises by 0.19% on average
(column 3). Investment, on the other hand, appears to respond rather weakly
(column 4).30 These results are qualitatively in line with previous work de-
30Panel A in Table 1.B.9, Appendix 1.B presents the same specification using establishment-
level outcomes, rather than firm-level outcomes. Magnitudes in this alternative specification
are much larger, but noisily estimated, likely because establishment-level variables are largely






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































scribing how employment responds to credit supply expansions (Di Maggio
and Kermani, 2017; Mian et al., 2020).
1.5.2 Robustness: Credit-supply shocks to firms
The IO reform allowed also companies to save on their mortgage payments
by taking out non-amortising loans. One possible concern with the estimates
in Table 1.3 is that they could reflect a change in credit supply to firms, rather
than a shift in household demand.
In order to rule out this potential confounder, we introduce an alternative
specification and include firm-by-year fixed-effects. By effectively partialling
out all firm-specific shocks occurring at any given point in time, this specifi-
cation allows to control for credit conditions faced by the firm, since these are
negotiated at the headquarter level. The remaining variation is purely cross-
sectional, comparing establishments belonging to the same firm in any given
year. The main downside of this model is that it restricts the sample to the
minority of firms having multiple establishments operating at the same point
in time (Figure 1.C.10 in Appendix 1.C).
Despite this very restrictive specification, in Table 1.4 the results appear
qualitatively in line with our baseline estimations. The first-stage equation
shows that the instrument remains strongly predictive of aggregate household
demand (column 1). In this specification, a 10% increase in household demand
raises revenues by 1.5% and leads to a change in profits by 1.2% (columns 2
and 3, respectively). For the same shift in consumption, employment grows
by 2.2% (column 4). Once again, investment does not appear to exhibit a sig-
nificant response (column 5). This evidence strongly supports the notion that
our estimates capture the effect of consumer demand on firm dynamics, rather
than the effects of credit provision to firms.
is only available for a subset of firms. To avoid these issues, we employ firm-level balance



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The magnitude of these estimates deserves some discussion, as coefficients
are significantly larger than those presented in Table 1.3. This difference can
be imputed to three reasons. First, in Table 1.4 we rely on establishment-level
data, a choice which yields larger magnitudes also in the baseline estima-
tions.31 Second, multi-establishment firms, the focus of Table 1.4, appear to
generally respond more to demand shocks than the general firm population.32
Finally, the inclusion of firm-time fixed-effects seems to improve both magni-
tude and significance of the estimates, compared to a model where firm and
time fixed effects are included separately.33
1.5.3 Productive capacity versus household demand channel
Credit booms may be beneficial to the economy. However, credit expansions
that affect the economy through the household demand channel can inflate the
non-tradable sector, often at the expense of the tradable one, a dynamic which
can amplify boom-bust dynamics and even reduce aggregate competitiveness
(Mian et al., 2020; Borio et al., 2016; Bahadir and Gumus, 2016).
Non-tradable firms are likely to respond more to local demand shocks, as
their revenues depend mostly on domestic spending capacity (Mian and Sufi,
2014). Thus, to test whether our baseline estimates reflect a demand-driven
shock, Table 1.5 splits the firm sample across sectors.
Column 1 shows that the manufacturing sector, typically characterised as
a tradable, does not display any response to an increase in household spend-
ing.34 On the other hand, financial services, insurance and real estate (column
31To see this, it is useful to compare estimates between Table 1.3 and Panel A of Table 1.B.9
in Appendix 1.B. Firm-level estimations focus on the response to spending shocks only in the
region where the headquarter is located, thus underestimating the response to true ”local”
shocks, those affecting establishments.
32See difference between panel A and panel B of Table 1.B.9 in Appendix 1.B.
33To see this, it is useful to compare the estimates in Table 1.4 with those in Panel B of
Table 1.B.9 in Appendix 1.B.
34This is in line with Borio et al. (2016) who find that during credit booms, growth of the
manufacturing sector comes to a halt or even contracts.
42
Table 1.5: Aggregate spending and firm-level outcomes: sectors
Manufacturing FIRE Retail Services
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Firm Firm Firm Firm
Panel A
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Revenue Revenue Revenue Revenue
̂log(Cmt) 0.011 0.037** 0.016** 0.036**
(0.011) (0.016) (0.007) (0.016)
Observations 63,345 123,611 133,364 115,067
Panel B
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Profit Profit Profit Profit
̂log(Cmt) -0.005 0.045** 0.017** 0.033**
(0.014) (0.022) (0.008) (0.015)
Observations 63,180 123,107 133,143 114,664
Panel C
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Employees Employees Employees Employees
̂log(Cmt) -0.006 0.039** 0.014** 0.034**
(0.015) (0.018) (0.006) (0.016)
Observations 63,351 123,631 133,364 115,184
Panel D
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Investment Investment Investment Investment
̂log(Cmt) 0.035 0.022 0.037 0.094*
(0.065) (0.068) (0.029) (0.050)
Observations 63,351 123,630 133,276 115,184
Firm Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: Data from Statistics Denmark, 2004-2010. Notes: 2SLS estimation. The dependent
variables measure end-year log-linearised values of: revenues (panel A), profits (panel
B), full-time equivalents (panel C), gross fixed-capital formation (panel D). ̂log(Cmt) mea-
sures aggregate household expenditure in a given municipality and year, measured as the
sum of imputed consumption for all resident households. Controls include municipality-
level house price growth, number of individuals living in the municipality in 2002, aver-
age liquid-asset-to-income ratio in the resident population in 2002; aggregate consumption
levels in 2002. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the municipality-level. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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2), as well as retail trade (column 3) and services (column 4), exhibit significant
responses to changes in local demand. These sectors can be generally charac-
terised as non-tradable, since their business depends largely on the spending
capacity of local residents. They all experience significant increases in rev-
enues and profits in response to a shift in consumption (columns 2–4 of Panel
A and B). Real effects are particularly pronounced in the financial, insurance
and real estate sector, where a 10% increase in regional expenditure raises the
number of full-time equivalents by 0.4% (column 2, Panel C). Given the same
shift, retail trade and services also significantly increase the number of full-
time employees, by 0.1% and 0.3%, respectively (columns 3 and 4). Invest-
ment is unaffected across all sectors. This is not particularly surprising, as in
the short run firms might find it easier to scale up their workforce, rather than
increase capital.
An alternative way to assess the relative effect on tradable versus non trad-
ables is to use firms’ balance sheets, exploiting variation across firms that dis-
play different degrees or openness to trade within a given sector.
When we define non-tradable firms based on their balance sheets, accord-
ing to the thresholds adopted by Mian and Sufi (2014) and adding fixed effects
for NACE 1 codes, the results are fundamentally unchanged (Table 1.B.10 in
Appendix 1.B).35
1.5.4 Competitiveness
The increase in non-tradable employment and the change in relative prices be-
tween non-tradable and tradable goods are unique characteristics of household-
demand driven expansions (Mian et al., 2020; Bahadir and Gumus, 2016). These
episodes can be accompanied by wage hikes in the non-tradable sector, which
35To be consistent with Mian and Sufi (2014), we define firms as being tradable if the sum of
their import and exports at the end of the year divided by the number of full-time equivalents
exceeds DKK 70,000, or USD 10,000. Firms are classified as non-tradable otherwise.
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may spill over to the tradable one, leading to a loss in competitiveness (Mian
et al., 2020). This real appreciation leads, in the aggregate, to a deteriorating
trade balance (Bahadir and Gumus, 2016).36
To test whether Danish firms experienced a loss in competitiveness due
to the introduction of IO loans, in Table 1.6 we analyse the developments of
wage bills, productivity, imports and exports, as companies are exposed to
differential demand shocks.
We find very little evidence of a loss in competitiveness among Danish
firms over the years 2004–2010. The wage bill remains constant, both in the
general sample and in the manufacturing sector (panels A and B, column 1).
We neither observe any decline in labour productivity (column 2), measured
as value added per full-time equivalent. Possibly as a consequence of this lack
of real appreciation, the relative size of imports and exports also remains un-
changed, both for manufacturing firms and for the overall sample (columns 3
and 4).
Firms active in the financial sectors, real estate and insurance exhibited the
strongest employment response to changes in local demand (Table 1.5). In-
deed, wages in these firms tend to increase significantly, in response to an out-
ward shift in consumption (Table 1.6, panel C, column 1). Despite the fact that
wage growth is not accompanied by a significant increase in labour produc-
tivity (column 2), these wage hikes do not appear to have spilled over to the
tradable sector. These results differ from those presented by Mian et al. (2020),
who show that U.S. states exposed to greater credit expansion exhibited higher
overall wage growth.
A possible explanation for this difference may be the dominant role played
by labour unions in the Danish economy. The strong collective bargaining sys-
36The economy’s overall competitiveness can also be hampered by labour reallocation from
more productive sectors, such as manufacturing, towards less productive ones, such as con-
struction (Borio et al., 2016). Once demand contracts, downward wage rigidities can amplify
the bust (Mian et al., 2020).
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Table 1.6: Aggregate spending and firm-level outcomes: competitiveness
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
VARIABLES Wage/FTE Value/FTE Imports/FTE Exports/FTE
Panel A
Overall Overall Overall Overall
̂log(Cmt) 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 0.044
(0.003) (0.005) (0.027) (0.040)
Observations 449,266 444,133 448,894 449,214
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
F Stat 57 57 57 57
Panel B
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Manufacturing Manufacturing Manufacturing Manufacturing
̂log(Cmt) 0.004 0.015* -0.150* 0.077
(0.007) (0.008) (0.085) (0.112)
Observations 63,350 62,732 63,316 63,329
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES FIRE FIRE FIRE FIRE
̂log(Cmt) 0.027*** 0.001 -0.021 0.125
(0.009) (0.015) (0.090) (0.093)
Observations 123,596 122,298 123,497 123,622
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: Data from Statistics Denmark, 2004-2010. Notes: 2SLS estimation. The dependent
variables measure end-year log-linearised values of wages per full-time equivalents (FTE)
(col. 1), value added per FTE (col. 2), imports per FTE (col. 3), exports per FTE (col.
4). ̂log(Cmt) measures the fitted values of aggregate household expenditure in a given
municipality and year. Controls include municipality-level house price growth, number
of individuals living in the municipality in 2002, average liquid-asset-to-income ratio in
the resident population in 2002; aggregate consumption levels in 2002. Standard errors, in
parentheses, are clustered at the municipality-level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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tem has a track record of keeping average wages aligned across the country,
and in check with productivity growth. This institutional feature might ex-
plain why we do not observe regional variation in the response of wages to
local demand shifts.
However, these results are to be interpreted with caution. Our empirical
strategy relies on regional exposure, implying that we cannot speak to aggre-
gate shocks. Real appreciation could still have occurred for the Danish econ-
omy as a whole, and our estimates would be unable to pick this up. Another
source of vulnerability could arise from labour reallocation from more produc-
tive sectors (manufacturing) towards less productive ones (construction). Our
estimates are also unable to shed light on these developments.
1.5.5 Aggregate employment effects
Danish households significantly increased their spending in the aftermath of
2003. Using a simple back-of-the envelope approach, we estimate the total in-
crease in household consumption to be worth at least DKK 15 billion between
2004 and 2010 (Figure 1.C.9 in Appendix 1.C). This amounts to about 2% of ag-
gregate household expenditure in 2002, and thus constitutes a sizeable increase
in aggregate demand.
To retrieve the aggregate employment implications of these results, we fol-
low a similar approach. Beraja et al. (2016) show that for the U.S., these cal-
culations perform well in determining the impact of demand shocks on em-
ployment losses.37 Because our analysis relies on regional variation, we follow
closely Hagedorn et al. (2015) and estimate a regionally-weighted measure of
the percentage change in aggregate employment that is caused by our measure
of credit-induced shift in consumption:
37Beraja et al. (2016) find that the responses of aggregate employment to regional variation
in household demand perform equally well when calculated with back-of-the-envelope or
when simulated in a heterogeneous agents model. At the same time, using regional variation
outperforms those estimations that rely on aggregate data.
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 = 0.09% (1.6)
where t defines each post-reform year (2004–2010). β1 is the coefficient in Equa-
tion (1.5), or the effect of IO expenditure on employment. We employ a con-
servative approach, and using the results in Table 1.3, we set this coefficient at
0.02. Spendingmt measures the regional consumption shock originating from
the reform in any given year (as defined in Equation (1.3)), expressed as a per-
centage change with respect to aggregate consumption in the same municipal-
ity in the year before the reform. Em,2002 measures employment in municipality
m in 2002, and EDK,2002 is aggregate pre-reform employment in Denmark. In
other words, we weight each municipality-level change in consumption for the
relative relevance of the same municipality in the Danish labour market.
This methodology allows us to retrieve an estimation of the aggregate em-





= 2, 500 (1.7)
We estimate that the reform created at least 2,500 positions (full-time equiv-
alents) between 2004 and 2010. We interpret this estimate as a lower bound,
for two reasons. First, we rely on our most conservative estimated coefficient:
choosing β1 from Table 1.4 would suggest that the same spending shock could
have created up to 27,000 jobs, over this time frame.
Second, Spendingmt is likely to severely underestimate the effect of the IO
reform on regional consumption. This measure only captures the cash-flow ef-
fect stemming from the refinancing of old amortising mortgages into IO ones,
but neglects the effect of the reform on home-buyers, or the general equilib-
rium effects resulting from changes in house prices.
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1.6 Conclusion
Credit supply shocks have been the object of intense scrutiny in the aftermath
of the Great Recession. Negative financial shocks transmit to the real economy,
generating significant losses in demand, production and employment. In this
chapter, we provide evidence that this financial channel is active also in boom
phases. Financial innovation, under the guise of a new mortgage product that
relaxes financial constraints across the population, had a significant effect on
Danish consumer demand during the 2000s. This demand shocks transmitted
to firms, creating additional revenues and jobs, and shifted the composition of
employment in favour of the non-tradable sector.
Our results speak to two potential vulnerabilities arising by the current
macroeconomic circumstances, characterised by ultra-low interest rates and
significant build-up of leverage across households and firms.
First, the fact that investment does not increase in response to a shift in con-
sumer demand, while employment does, is puzzling. This may be a function
of the sectoral shift, as non-tradable firms are less capital intensive. However,
on the margin, this evidence may also suggests that firms expected the de-
mand shock to be of temporary nature. In most cases, it is easier to layoff
workers than reduce capital. This line of reasoning resonates with the litera-
ture suggesting that credit-fuelled demand boosts generate temporary gains,
at the expense of longer-term losses. Second, we find no evidence of real ap-
preciation: wages do not rise and exports do not decline, in response to larger
shocks to local demand. We attribute this evidence, which contrasts with the
findings of Mian et al. (2020) on the U.S. case, to the role that collective bargain-
ing plays across the vast majority of firms in the Danish economy. In situations
where regional wage growth is not kept in check by collective bargaining, real
appreciation stemming from an inflation of the non-tradable sector might spill




What are the effects of a shock granting cash-constrained households access to
additional liquidity?
To answer this question, we present a stylized model which is closely re-
lated to Galı́ et al. (2007). In an otherwise standard consumption-saving model,
Galı́ et al. (2007) study the effect of a temporary government spending shock
on consumption when a fraction of households is liquidity constrained. Simi-
larly, the alleviation of liquidity constraints from taking up an IO mortgage is
also of temporary nature. We make some crucial alterations to the model by
Galı́ et al. (2007). Specifically, we remove the government sector and introduce
lending.
The model economy is populated by a continuum of infinitely lived house-
holds of mass one. A fraction (1−λ) of households optimises intertemporarily
(henceforth called optimising households) and a fraction λ is liquidity-constrained.
The utility function U of both types of households is given as:




where Nt denotes hours worked, Ct denotes consumption and ψ is the
labour supply elasticity with 1 > ψ ≥ 0.
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Optimising households. They consume, rent capital out to firms, and
work. We extend the model by making these households lenders to liquid-
ity constrained households. The budget constraint of optimising households,











t +Dt +Rt−1Lt−1 (1.9)
where the left-hand-side defines outflows; Pt is the price level (or the price
of the final good), and It denotes investment. Optimising households lend
funds Lt to constrained households in the beginning of period t. Inflows, to
be found on the right-hand-side, consist of labour income WtPtN ot , interest for
rented out capital RktPtKot , dividends Dt from owning firms, and repayment
of funds which constrained households borrowed in the previous period, (1 +
rt−1)Lt−1. There is no risk of default. Thus, the lending rate is equal to the risk
free rate (1 + r = R).
Optimising households maximise Equation (1.8) subject to the sequence of
Equations (1.9) (i.e. they maximise intertemporarily), and subject to the capital
accumulation equation which features investment adjustment costs, φ, defined
as:






with φ′(.) > 0, φ′′(.) < 0, φ(δ) = δ, φ′(δ) = 1.

































In the perfectly competitive labour market, optimal labour supply (obtained
from maximising for Nt) is:
Wt = Ct(Nt)
ψ (1.14)
Liquidity constrained households. These households, denoted by super-
script l, do not optimise intertemporarily but consume their entire budget ev-
ery period. Their budget constraint is given as
PtC
l





where inflows come from labour income and liquid funds which are bor-
rowed from optimising households, all in period t. Outflows consist of con-
sumption in period t, and repayment of funds borrowed in the previous pe-





where χt is an exogenous AR(1) process, χt = ρχt−1 + εt where ρ is the
autocorrelation coefficient with 0 < ρ < 1 and εX ∼ N (0, σ2X) . Thus, a positive
shock to χ similarly alleviates credit and liquidity constraints.39
38Borrowing against labour income is a standard assumption when studying the effect of
household credit, see e.g. Bahadir and Gumus (2016). For work on liquidity-constrained
households that can borrow against home equity, see e.g. Hurst and Stafford (2004).
39For simplicity reasons, we model an increase in liquidity for constrained households as an
exogenous shock to credit availability.
52
Equation (1.15) together with Equation (1.16) highlights that each period,
consumption of constrained households is always equal to labour income plus
liquidity from borrowing, less repayment of borrowed liquidity from last pe-
riod:








Following Galı́ et al. (2007), we assume that in steady state, consumption of
the two types is equated. As a result, also steady state hours worked are equal.











t + (1− λ)Cot (1.19)
which states that total consumption is the sum of both household types of
consumption. And analogously for labour:
Nt = λN
l
t + (1− λ)N ot (1.20)
Investment only comes from Ricardian households:
It = (1− λ)Iot (1.21)
Kt = (1− λ)Kot (1.22)




Final and intermediate goods producers. There is a perfectly competi-
tive final goods producer and a continuum of monopolistically competitive
intermediate goods firms, indexed on unit interval j ∈ [0, 1]. The final goods





where Yt(j) is the quantity of intermediate goods used in the production of





















with resulting cost minimisation problem
minKt,NtR
k












Price setting. Following Galı́ et al. (2007), we include Calvo (1983) sticky
prices. θ ∈ [0, 1] defines the probability of a firm receiving a signal (in any
particular time period) which forces it to keep its price unchanged. Thus, each
period, a fraction of 1 − θ of intermediate goods firms resets prices. When
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setting its price, a firm maximises the discounted sum of its future profits over











s.t. the demand for input, as derived in Equation (1.25)










with price markup µp = εd
εd−1
Aggregate price level is
Pt =
[
θP 1−εdt−1 + (1− θ)(P ∗t )1−εd
] 1
1−εd (1.32)
Monetary policy follows a simple interest rate rule
rt = r + φππt (1.33)
where φπ > 0, r is steady state nominal interest rate and πt denotes infla-
tion.













Yt = Ct + It (1.37)
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From the log-linearised versions of Equations (1.17), (1.18), (1.19), (1.23),







θn ≡ λΓ(1− α)(1− ψ)ψ,
σ ≡ (1− λ)Γ[µpψγc + (1− α)],
θl ≡ Γµpγcγlψ,
where Γ ≡ (µpψγc + (1 − α)(1 − λ(1 + ψ)))−1 and γc ≡ CY (the steady state
ratio of consumption to output), and γl ≡ LC (the steady state ratio of liquidity
obtained through borrowing to consumption).
Equation (1.38) highlights that in response to an increase in liquidity, con-
sumption rises on impact. As a result, output, labour and wages increase.
Similar to the model by Galı́ et al. (2007), there is a feedback effect between
labour income and consumption: the rise in labour income raises consump-
tion further. In this model, there exists also a feedback effect between labour
income and liquidity for constrained households. When labour income rises,
constrained households can obtain even more liquidity.40
We keep the calibrations as in the model by Galı́ et al. (2007) and further-
more set γl to 0.01. The following graph depicts impulse response functions
(IRFs) to an exogenous increase in liquidity for constrained households, mod-
elled as a positive shock to χt, the share of labour income that can be lever-
aged. The shock hits the economy in the beginning of period t and every agent
understands it to be autocorrelated (with a coefficient of 0.8). The upper left
40This amplification effect exhibits some similarity to the Danish economy where house
prices rose after the mortgage reform allowing households to increase borrowing further
(Bäckman and Lutz, 2016).
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Figure 1.A.1: IRFs to a positive liquidity shock


































































































































Notes: Impulse response functions to a shock which raises liquidity for liquidity constrained
households, i.e. a positive shock to χ with an autocorrelation of 0.8. “lambda” denotes the
share (or the number) of constrained households in the economy.
panel of Figure 1.A.1 mirrors the evolution of χ. Liquidity rises on impact (up-
per middle panel). Because constrained households spend all their liquidity
each period, this immediately translates into higher consumption (upper right
panel). Higher demand raises output, labour and wages (lower three panels of
Figure 1.A.1). This reinforces constrained households’ ability to raise liquidity
and consumption.
Just as in Galı́ et al. (2007), the number (which is equivalent to the share)
of constrained households in the economy is crucial for the extent to which
variables respond to a boost in liquidity: the dashed line depicts IRFs when
half of all households is constrained, the solid line when only 10 percent of
households are constrained. The upper right panel depicts that the higher the
number of liquidity constrained households in the economy, the larger is the
absolute shift in consumption.
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1.B Tables











Municipality FE Yes Yes Yes
Family controls Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.030 0.039 0.025
Observations 99,442 99,468 99,471
Source: Registry data, Danish population, 1996-2010. Notes: Results include only a bal-
anced panel of households that were recorded as homeowners for tax purposes in the
year 2002 and never moved or changed tenure status through the sample period. Coeffi-
cients to be interpreted in DKK thousands. The dependent variable is the average change
in spending after the placebo reform years 1999, 2000 and 2001, respectively, compared to
the two years before the placebo year. Assignment to treatment or control group is based
on the liquid savings-to-income ratio in the respective placebo pre-reform year (i.e. 1998,
1999 and 2000). Household level controls include the house value in 2002 (logs); annual
household income (logs); age of the household head (defined as the person with the high-
est income); number of family members and number of children in 2002. Standard errors






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.B.5: Homeowners’ expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
VARIABLES ∆C04 ∆C05 ∆C06 ∆C07 ∆C08 ∆C09 ∆C10
Constr2002 5.1*** 3.7*** 8.5*** 9.3*** 7.4*** 5.5*** 4.4***
(1.18) (0.92) (0.80) (0.72) (0.66) (0.61) (0.57)
age (head) 0.23 0.43** 0.71*** 0.77*** 0.79*** 0.84*** 0.93***
(0.23) (0.17) (0.15) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11)
No. member -4.3*** -6.1*** -9.3*** -5.7*** -4.9*** -4.4*** -4.2***
(1.42) (1.12) (0.89) (0.78) (0.76) (0.84) (0.91)
House P. -2.6 -3.5** -10.9*** -1.1 4.3*** 5.7*** 3.5**
(0.10) (0.78) (0.68) (0.61) (0.58) (0.53) (0.49)
No. children 16.0*** 14.3*** 14.4*** 8.2*** 6.9*** 6.1*** 5.8***















Constant 0.28 -0.22*** -0.29*** -22.38 -58.38*** -43.98*** -1.61
(0.52) (0.36) (0.28) (0.145) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14)
Obs. 99,491 99,487 99,455 99,421 99,387 99,347 99,283
R-squared 0.044 0.109 0.160 0.197 0.277 0.332 0.385
Source: Registry data, Danish population, 1996-2010. Notes: Results include only a bal-
anced panel of households that were recorded as homeowners for tax purposes in the year
2002 and never moved or changed tenure status through the sample period. Coefficients
to be interpreted in DKK thousands. The dependent variable is the expanding average of
the change in spending from a similar period before the reform. Household level controls
include contemporaneous house value (logs); respective contemporaneous moving aver-
ages of household income (logs); contemporaneous age of the household head (defined as
the person with the highest income); contemporaneous number of family members and
number of children. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to heteroskedasticity and
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.B.8: The instrument and firm-level outcomes: Reduced-form equation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Revenues Profit Employment Investment
VARIABLES Firm Firm Firm Firm
log(Spendingmt) 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.015*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009)
HPricem,t−1 -0.010** -0.003 -0.009** 0.009
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.013)
Popm,2002 0.037*** 0.041*** 0.056*** -0.069
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.061)
Liqu./Incomem,2002 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.022*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.013)
log(Cm,2002) -0.048*** -0.051*** -0.066*** 0.049
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.068)
Observations 409,847 408,676 409,987 409,898
R-squared 0.987 0.979 0.984 0.674
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: Data from Statistics Denmark, 2004-2010. Notes: The dependent variables mea-
sure end-year log-linearised values of: revenues (col.1), profits (col.2), full-time equiv-
alents (col.3), gross fixed-capital formation (col. 4). log(Spendingmt) is the instrument,
constructed as the interaction between the number of liquidity-constrained homeowners
living in the municipality in 2002 and the average spending shock in any given year, mea-
sured by α1. Municipality-level house price growth, HPricem,t−1, is measured as the
change in the average sale price per sqm. Popm,2002 counts the number of individuals
living in the municipality in 2002; Liqu./Incomem,2002 measures the average liquid-asset-
to-income ratio in the resident population in 2002; log(Cm,2002) measures aggregate con-
sumption levels in 2002. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the municipality-
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.B.9: Spending and establishment-level outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Revenues Profit Employment Investment
VARIABLES Estab. Estab. Estab. Estab.
PANEL A
̂log(Cmt) 0.129* 0.088 0.171** 0.138*
(0.070) (0.060) (0.068) (0.080)
Observations 443,904 259,173 431,682 165,260
R-squared 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.042
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
F Stat 57 45 57 51
PANEL B
̂log(Cmt) 0.141* 0.099* 0.196*** 0.132*
(0.072) (0.059) (0.072) (0.074)
Observations 116,719 70,625 111,414 73,785
R-squared 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.024
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
F Stat 61 55 61 58
Source: Data from Statistics Denmark, 2004-2010. Notes. The dependent variables are mea-
sured at the establishment level, and represent end-year log-linearised values of: revenues
(col.1), profits (col.2), head count of employees (col.3), gross fixed-capital formation (col.4).
Panel A includes all firms for which establishment level data is available; panel B only
multi-establishment firms. ̂log(Cmt) measures the fitted values of aggregate household
expenditure in a given municipality and year. Controls include municipality-level house
price growth, number of individuals living in the municipality in 2002, average liquid-
asset to income ratio in the resident population in 2002; aggregate consumption levels in
2002. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the municipality-level. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 1.B.10: Aggregate spending and firm-level outcomes: tradables and non-
tradables
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Revenues Revenues Profits Profits
Firm Firm Firm Firm
2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
VARIABLES NT T NT T
̂log(Cmt) 0.032*** 0.010 0.033*** 0.007
(0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006)
Observations 283,406 115,208 282,730 114,797
Firm Fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Employment Employment Investment Investment
Firm Firm Firm Firm
VARIABLES NT T NT T
̂log(Cmt) 0.027** 0.006 0.041 0.061**
(0.010) (0.005) (0.037) (0.031)
Observations 283,503 115,240 283,427 115,224
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Source: Data from Statistics Denmark, 2004-2010. Notes. The dependent variables mea-
sure end-year log-linearised values of: revenues (col.1-2), profits (col.3-4), full-time equiv-
alents (col.5-6), gross fixed-capital formation (col. 7-8). Columns marked by T and NT
include only tradable and non-tradable firms, respectively. Firms are defined as tradable
if their ratio of imports+exports to full-time equivalents exceeds DKK 70,000 during the
year, non-tradable otherwise. ̂log(Cmt) measures the fitted values of aggregate household
expenditure in a given municipality and year. Controls include municipality-level house
price growth, number of individuals living in the municipality in 2002, average liquid-
asset to income ratio in the resident population in 2002; aggregate consumption levels in
2002. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the municipality-level. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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1.C Figures



















2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Year
Non-tradable Total Empl. Mortgage Debt Consumption
Source: Statistics Denmark. Notes: Year-on-year growth rates in household expenditure, mort-
gage debt, aggregate employment, and employment in the non-tradable sector. The non-
tradable sector excludes agriculture, government, manufacturing and the advanced part of
services (management consultancy; IT).
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Source: Andersen et al. (2019), based on third-party reporting from credit institutions to Dan-
marks Nationalbank.
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Figure 1.C.3: Performance of registry data in matching the aggregate figures
Source: Statistics Denmark. Notes: Aggregate data is based on publicly available counts of
employer firms; Registry data defines the count of firms stemming from the administrative
datasets.
70









0 20 40 60 80 1002
Savings to Months of Income
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Source: Statistics Denmark. Notes: Distribution of the liquid savings/months of income ratio in
2002. Liquid savings are defined as the sum of cash held in bank accounts, stocks and bonds.
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Figure 1.C.5: Relationship between liquid savings-to-income ratio in 2002 and
IO mortgage holdings in 2009
Source: Statistics Denmark. Notes: The regression displays the relationship between ownership
of an IO mortgage in 2009 and liquid savings/months of income for the same household in
2002.
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Figure 1.C.6: Number of liquidity-constrained homeowners in 2002, by munic-
ipality
(2576,13044.5] (1442,2576] (959,1442] (735,959] [276.5,735]
Households, '000
Source: Statistics Denmark. Notes: Count of liquidity-constrained homeowners by municipal-
ity, measured at the end of 2002. Liquidity-constrained homeowners are defined as households
having less than 1.5 months of income in liquid savings. Sample is restricted to homeowners
between the ages of 25 and 64 who are continuously observed in the registries between 2002
and 2010 and who never buy or sell their property during the same time frame.
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1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Coefficient associated with number of liquidity-constrained homeowners in 2002
Change in Household Consumption, Municipality-Level
Source: Statistics Denmark. Notes: The dependent variable is the sum of imputed consumption
for each year/municipality cell. The graph depicts the coefficients associated with the inter-
action between year dummies and the number of liquidity-constrained homeowners living in
the municipality in 2002. Municipality and year fixed effects are included. Standard errors are
robust to heteroskedasticity.
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2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Coefficient associated with number of liquidity-constrained homeowners in 2002
Total Employment (log) Municipality Level
Source: Statistics Denmark. Notes: The dependent variable FTEs in each establishment, aggre-
gated at the year/municipality level. The graph depicts the coefficients associated with the
interaction between year dummies and the number of liquidity-constrained homeowners liv-
ing in the municipality in 2002. Municipality and year fixed-effects are included. Standard
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
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Figure 1.C.9: Estimated aggregate consumption shift
Source: Statistics Denmark. Notes: Total expenditure shocks due to the refinancing channel
of IO loans for each year. This is computed as the average annual consumption shifts for
liquidity-constrained homeowners from Equation 1.3 multiplied by the number of liquidity
constrained homeowners living in Denmark in 2002.
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Figure 1.C.10: Distribution of number of establishments by firm





Transmission – A Supply Side
Story?
Note: A similar version of this chapter is in the process of being published as a Bun-
desbank Discussion Paper as ”Hampered Interest Rate Pass-Through – a Supply Side
Story?”, and was co-authored with Dr Lotta Heckmann-Draisbach, who works in the
Banking Supervision Department of Deutsche Bundesbank; e-mail: lotta.heckmann-
draisbach@bundesbank.de. This work was presented (exclusively by myself) in the
internal research seminar of Deutsche Bundesbank in 2018, at the CESifo Workshop
on banking and institutions in 2019, in the internal seminar of the School of Eco-
nomics, University of Edinburgh in 2019, and in the 7th Workshop in Macro Banking
and Finance at Collegio Carlo Alberto Turin in 2019. The data used in this chapter
was accessed through Deutsche Bundesbank, during my research visit there, and later
also via my co-author Lotta. I am grateful to Dr Thomas Kick for allowing me access
to the data. Deutsche Bundesbank does not bear any responsibility for the analysis and
discussion of results in this paper.
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2.1 Introduction
During the Great Recession, central banks in the U.S. and Europe have inter-
vened heavily in order to boost banks’ loan provision. However, this hinges on
the assumption that, apart from its effect through real interest rates, monetary
policy has a direct effect on the real economy via credit supply.1 Consequently,
examining the pass-through of monetary policy and factors that hamper the
transmission to financial and real variables has once again become an impor-
tant topic for policy and research (Agarwal et al., 2017; Di Maggio et al., 2017;
Drechsler et al., 2017).
Frictions on both the credit supply and the demand side drag on the trans-
mission of monetary policy not only to lending volumes (Agarwal et al., 2017;
Drechsler et al., 2017) but also to prices. In particular, imperfect competition in
banking markets seems to be associated with a hampered transmission to retail
rates (Adams and Amel, 2011; Fungáčová et al., 2014; Leroy, 2014; Sääskilahti,
2016; Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2013; Gropp et al., 2014). Despite a large body of
literature on the topic, the question about the underlying channel has remained
largely unanswered. This is because research on monetary policy transmis-
sion to retail rates has so far only worked with realised interest rates over
time which are however the result of a combination of shifts in credit demand
and supply. Reasons for a hampered pass-through may lie within the banking
sector making it optimal for institutions with more market power to transmit
smaller fractions of positive interest rate shocks to retail rates. Alternatively, it
may be the case that across banks with varying degrees of market power, credit
demand shifts systematically differently over the business cycle. The former
1Bernanke et al. (1988; 1992) motivate the credit channel under which banks can be crucial in
transmitting monetary policy to real variables. This channel can be divided into balance sheet
and bank lending channel. The former establishes the importance of borrowers’ balance sheets in
the transmission of shocks to the external finance premium and real variables (Bernanke and
Gertler, 1989, 1995; Bernanke et al., 1999). The latter focuses on how monetary policy affects
these variables through the side of the lenders (Bernanke and Blinder, 1992; Kashyap and Stein,
1994, 2000).
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mechanism identifies frictions on the credit supply side; the latter instead tells
a credit demand story.
We aim at filling this gap in the literature and leverage a unique super-
visory data set, the 2017 low-interest-rate survey, and determine whether im-
perfectly competitive banking markets impede monetary policy transmission
through the supply side of credit markets. In spring 2017, the German Fed-
eral Financial Authority and Deutsche Bundesbank conducted a supervisory
measure which required all small and medium-sized banks in Germany to re-
port interest rates for loans and deposits. In particular, end-of-2017 projected
retail rates for two different predefined scenarios taking place over the same
time horizon were to be disclosed: i) a hypothetical exogenous and permanent
monetary policy contraction and ii) no change in monetary policy as opposed
to the end of 2016. This data set is exceptional for two reasons: because of
its coverage (88 percent of all credit institutions in Germany2) and because it
delivers two data points per bank, one for each scenario, which we can use
as treatment and counterfactual outcome, respectively. By taking the differ-
ence between the retail rates in the shock and the constant scenario, we can
partial out any other factors whose change banks expect to influence interest
rates over the course of 2017. Consequently, expected shifts in credit demand
unrelated to the monetary policy change are controlled for. This allows us to
assess the supply-sided effect of imperfect competition among banks on the
pass-through of monetary policy to loan and deposit rates.
We identify imperfect competition through two variables: an individual-
level Lerner Index which measures the degree to which a bank can charge
a markup on the reference rate; and a geographic measure of concentration,
the Herfindahl index. Our results suggest that following a contraction in the
policy rate, a bank’s pass-through to loan rates is on average smaller by 4–5
2The only other data source available containing interest rates at the individual level (MFI
interest rate statistic) is a substantially smaller subset of all German banks (Weth, 2002).
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percentage points when the bank belongs to the 90th percentile of the pricing
power distribution or when operating in a highly concentrated market. Banks
also exert market power in the deposit market to a substantial degree: in a
highly concentrated deposit market, banks have a lower average pass-through
by almost 10 percentage points.
Results are confounded if – despite the instructions – banks assume credit
demand to shift differently in the two scenarios. Because bankers understand
the first scenario as an adverse scenario, they might assume credit demand to
contract only in the shock scenario.3 If they do so, they are likely to base their
expectations on past events. Following increases in the policy rate, demand
in the EU generally falls to a larger extent at riskier banks (Altavilla et al.,
2018) and riskier banks tend to have less market power (Kick and Prieto, 2014).
Therefore, predicted demand shifts should be larger at banks with lower lev-
els of market power. An expected drop in demand would counteract the up-
ward pressure on the price from an exogenous increase in funding costs and
we should therefore observe a relatively smaller pass-through at banks with
less market power. The fact that we find the opposite, suggests that we are
identifying a pure credit supply shift. In any case, our results provide a lower
bound on the differential pass-through between banks with high versus low
market power. Because German banks operate locally and we find that banks
in imperfectly competitive markets have higher profits and return on assets,
our results furthermore indicate that these banks are likely to have the capac-
ity to build relationships with their borrowers and subsequently insure them
against adverse shocks.
Our findings speak to various strands of the literature debating about the
3In stress testing exercises, the shock scenario is the one that challenges banks’ balance
sheets. Often, the adverse scenario also entails a macroeconomic scenario with a predefined
decline in GDP. See e.g. https://www.esrb.europa.eu/mppa/stress/shared/
pdf/esrb.20180131_EBA_stress_test_scenario__macrofinancial.en.pdf?
43a5f3c6c04f2daa03bd950b55d8897b, viewed 20 February 2020.
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effect of imperfect competition on loan and deposit pricing. Regarding inter-
est rate levels, banks may extract monopolistic rents in concentrated markets
and thus set relatively lower deposit rates and higher loan rates than in a com-
petitive market (Berger, 1995).4 However, a conflicting hypothesis postulates
that efficiency and concentration can be positively correlated leading to an op-
posite relationship between market power and retail rates (Berger, 1995). On a
similar note, market power can facilitate relationship lending which, through a
reduction in information asymmetries, may lead to more favourable outcomes
for some borrowers (Rajan, 1992; Petersen and Rajan, 1995).5 Turning to ad-
justments in retail rates, we could expect banks with more market power to
raise loan (deposit) rates to a relatively larger (smaller) extent in response to
contractionary monetary policy, provided that they act as standard monopo-
lists. In contrast, bank-borrower relationships could lead pricing-power banks
to smooth adjustments in retail rates, insuring in particular their borrowers
against adverse events.
Macroeconomic models similarly formulate situations in which monopolis-
tic competition leads to both amplified and mitigated responses in retail rates.
Moreover, a hampering effect can feed through the demand or the supply side
of credit.6
This paper confirms for the German context that banks in more concen-
trated markets charge higher loan rates and offer lower deposit rates. Further-
more, monetary policy transmission and market power are negatively related
which is in line with most of the previous literature. In particular, Van Leuven-
4In the banking literature, this is also referred to as the structure-conduct-performance
paradigm (Berger, 1995).
5While the majority of work finds results in favour of the former theory (Hannan and
Berger, 1991; Sapienza, 2002), Fungáčová et al. (2017) concur that banks with market power
charge less for loans to small and medium sized firms in Europe.
6For amplification, see e.g. Gerali et al. (2010) or Duffie and Krishnamurthy (2016). Models
for a hampered pass-through via the supply side are provided by Martinez-Miera and Repullo
(2018) and Corbae and Levine (2018). However the same outcome in monopolistic banking
markets can occur due to constraints on the demand side (Güntner, 2011).
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steijn et al. (2013) and Gropp et al. (2014) conclude an impaired pass-trough
of monetary policy to realised loan and deposit rates with respect to within-
banking sector competition in Europe. Schlueter et al. (2016) identify the same
pattern for Germany. We contribute to the literature by showing that supply
side effects dominate.
To our knowledge, only Drechsler et al. (2017) establish a direct, impeding
effect of deposit market concentration on the transmission of monetary pol-
icy. Using geographical variation in the degree of concentration, they find that
bank branches in more concentrated markets widen the spread between de-
posit rates and the Fed funds rate in response to a monetary policy contraction
relative to a branch of the same bank but operating in a less concentrated mar-
ket (Drechsler et al., 2017).7 This result, however, is likely to be specific to the
U.S. case. Inherent structural differences across the two banking markets as
well as effects that the recent financial crisis and different extraordinary mon-
etary policy measures had on them raise doubts on whether findings for the
U.S. can be translated to Europe. In contrast to the U.S., our data for instance
indicates that counties with high banking market concentration in Germany
are on average smaller and populated by a lower share of people over the
age of 65. Furthermore, the sovereign debt crisis in 2011/12 posed a particu-
lar challenge to Europe’s unintegrated banking market and lead the European
Central Bank (ECB) to target sovereign spreads of particular countries in Eu-
rope, a phenomenon which was absent in the U.S.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 motivates the research ques-
tion theoretically, section 2.3 introduces the data sets, section 2.4 outlines the
measures of imperfect competition and section 2.5 specifies the empirical ap-
proach and presents results. Section 2.6 contains robustness tests and section
2.7 concludes.
7This ultimately drives heterogeneities in bank lending, i.e. loan quantities. In contrast, we
solely focus on prices.
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2.2 Conceptual framework
In theoretical models, banking markets are commonly characterised by some
sort of imperfect competition (Gerali et al., 2010; Martinez-Miera and Repullo,
2018). In the context of monetary policy transmission, the central bank’s policy
rate can furthermore be interpreted as a bank’s marginal costs since banks con-
sider it as the reference rate for their funding (Agarwal et al., 2017; Martinez-
Miera and Repullo, 2018; Corbae and Levine, 2018).
The standard textbook model of monopolistic competition provides a use-
ful and simple framework to formalise changes in prices for loans where p
stands for the rate a bank charges for one unit of loan, q. Accordingly, a change
in the equilibrium price can be the result of cost and/or demand shifts. A









where dx denotes an exogenous parallel cost shift (i.e. x denotes the intercept
of the marginal cost curve) and di a demand shift (i.e. i is the intercept of
the inverse demand curve). The first term on the right-hand side of Equation
(2.1) captures the equilibrium price change after a cost shock in the absence of
demand shifts, and the second term the corresponding change after a demand
shift when no funding costs shock is present. In the event that both shocks
occur at the same time, Equation (2.1) formalises the full adjustment of the
price from the old to the new equilibrium. For any functional form of demand




















is the change in the equilibrium quantity in response to a change in
costs, ∂p
∂i
is the partial derivative of demand with respect to its intercept and
∂q
∂i
reflects the dependence of the equilibrium quantity on the intercept of the
demand curve.8 Equation (2.2) shows that the equilibrium price adjustment
to any of the shocks depends on the slope of the demand curve, ∂p
∂q
. Thus, the
steepness of demand (or the elasticity of demand) determines not only the ex-
tent to which a monopolist can exert market power9, but also the adjustment
of the equilibrium price in response to shocks. If for every loan quantity bor-
rowers are suddenly willing to pay a different price, demand shifts. Here, a
productivity shock or a shock to agent’s expectations about the evolution of
the business cycle may be one reason. Alternatively, a monetary policy shock
which causes a change in the cost of funds affects marginal costs: a monetary
policy contraction increases costs and shifts the marginal cost curve up, lead-
ing to a higher equilibrium loan rate (see Figure 2.2.1). Equation (2.2) demon-
strates that the size of the price adjustment always depends on the slope of
demand and the according degree of the monopolist’s pricing power.
Papers examining realised interest rates and their response to a change in
the reference rate, observe rates over the monetary and business cycle where
dp is the change in the price over time, dp = pt+1−pt. According to derivations
above, heterogeneities in dp can either stem from different supply side adjust-
ments or from credit demand shifts unrelated to monetary policy changes. In
particular, it is plausible that demand behaves systematically differently across
banks with varying levels of market power; in that event, resulting hetero-
geneities in the transmission of monetary policy are not a result of frictions on
the credit supply side.
8See Appendix 2.A.1 for proof.
9Solving maxq π = p(q)q − c(q) gives dp(q)dq q + p(q)−
dc(q)
dq = 0. Rewriting leads to
p(q)[dpdq
q
p − 1] = mc with
dc(q)
dq denoting marginal costs, mc. The elasticity of demand, ε, is
ε = dqdp
p




mc which is the definition of the Lerner Index.
Therefore, the less elastic demand in the old equilibrium point, the more market power a bank
can exert. Note, maximising over p instead of q leads to the same results.
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Figure 2.2.1: Monopolistic competition
Note: The figure shows the pass-through of a cost shock to prices in two markets with monop-
olistic competition. Panel A considers a case with a relatively flat demand curve, i.e. a market
in which a monopolist can exert relatively less market power; Panel B considers a case with
a relatively steep demand curve, i.e. a market with relatively more market power. (Inverse)
demand is denoted by p(q), marginal revenues by mr and marginal costs by mc. A demand
shock would shift p(q), and accordingly mr.
In order to disentangle the role of the supply from the demand side in the
transmission of monetary policy to interest rates, the ideal setting would be
one where for every bank j, we have information on prices for two different
counterfactual scenarios occurring at time t, one in which a monetary policy
shock, dx, is zero and one in which it is equal to some (positive) value. The
difference between the new loan rates in the two scenarios, both observed in
t+1, could then be defined as the pass-through of monetary policy. Specifically,
this would lead to:
dpj = pj,t+1|dx>0 − pj,t+1|dx=0 (2.3)
where pi,t+1|dx>0 represents the predicted loan rate in the shock scenario and
pi,t+1|dx=0 the one in the scenario where no monetary policy shock occurs. dpj
would then correspond to the pure supply-side adjustment in prices in re-
sponse to an exogenous monetary policy contraction because everything else
that occurs between t and t + 1 would automatically be cancelled out. This
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by simply regressing dpj on a measure of market power.10
In this simple model, monetary policy does not shift the demand curve.
As shown in Figure 2.2.1, demand falls as a result of higher loan rates, repre-
sented by a movement along the demand curve. Yet, because a monetary pol-
icy contraction may affect borrowers’ balance sheets, the change in credit de-
mand could be amplified. A monetary contraction may result in declining as-
set prices which shrink collateral and ultimately the desire to invest (Bernanke
and Gertler, 1989; Bernanke et al., 1999). Thus, it is plausible that credit de-
mand shifts inwards in the shock as opposed to the constant scenario. This
would not be cancelled out when defining the pass-through of monetary policy
according to Equation (2.3) and estimating Equation (2.4) would consequently
mask the influence of credit demand on the pass-through of monetary policy.
However, evidence strongly indicates that borrowers do not assign ran-
domly to lenders (Schwert, 2018). As a result, demand shifts are likely to vary
systematically across banks. Indeed, Altavilla et al. (2018) find that in response
to a monetary policy contraction, loan demand in the Euro area generally falls
to a smaller extent at less riskier banks.11 In addition, banks with more mar-
ket power can be considered as less risky since they can realise profits from
monopoly rents while in competitive markets, banks have to search for yield
in riskier investments. Kick and Prieto (2014) confirm such a negative relation-
10Note that even in the simple model presented here, when market power is measured by
the slope of demand, the direction is ambiguous; there exists a threshold in the slope of de-
mand below which the above relationship is positive but turns negative above. The analytical
solution to the threshold is derived in Appendix 2.A.2.
11Results are obtained from the bank lending survey (BLS) for a time horizon that includes
our time frame, i.e. 2002Q4 to 2017Q4 (Altavilla et al., 2018). The BLS collects information on
credit supply and demand conditions for 150 institutions among which 30 are German. Bank
risk is measured by their CDS spreads.
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ship between market power and bank risk taking for German banks.12
Therefore, if demand shifted inwards in the shock scenario, this shift would
be relatively larger at banks with lower levels of market power, mitigating
the upward pressure on the price from the monetary policy contraction. As
a result, dpj would ceteris paribus be smaller at less monopolistic banks. In
other words, if an inward shift in demand in the constant scenario had a major
contribution to the pass-through, dpj would be larger among banks with more
market power (giving Equation (2.4) a positive sign).
2.3 Data
We merge bank-level supervisory data of all banks in Germany with a unique
dataset that contains interest rates for various product categories on banks’
asset and liability sides: the 2017 low-interest-rate survey.
2.3.1 The 2017 low-interest-rate survey
Between April and June 2017, the German Federal Financial Authority (hence-
forth BaFin) and Deutsche Bundesbank (henceforth Bundesbank) conducted a
supervisory measure on all 1,555 small and medium-sized German credit in-
stitutions on their profitability and resilience in the low-interest-rate environ-
ment.13
The data contains outcomes from various stress tests on interest rate risk,
credit risk and market risk collected in a bottom-up exercise. Supervisory stress
tests in the context of banking supervision are generally conducted in top-down
12Precisely, using the Lerner Index to measure individual pricing power, the authors find
that market power in Germany (between 1994 and 2010) is significantly negatively related
to several measures of bank risk, i.e. the probability of experiencing a distress event (e.g.
receiving capital support), the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, and the z-score
(Kick and Prieto, 2014).
13The supervisory measure was conducted on all banks which are supervised by BaFin and
Bundesbank according to § 6b KWG. Significant institutions (SIs) under direct European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB) supervision are excluded.
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and bottom-up exercises. Top-down refers to tests which the supervisory insti-
tutions run based on the bank-by-bank reporting data they have on the su-
pervised banks; in bottom-up exercises, banks are obliged to run simulations
or calculations themselves using their individual risk management assump-
tions and parameters while complying with constraints given by the author-
ities. Results need to be reported to the supervisors which in turn conduct
quality assurance to ensure comparable results. While the exact modelling of
banks is unknown, the bottom-up approach allows a more individual and thus
more meaningful reflection of the banks’ vulnerabilities under a certain sce-
nario when taking into account data that the authorities do not have at hand.
For our purpose, we work with the stress test data on interest rate risk.
In particular, banks had to report retail rates for loans and deposits which
they would set in response to two hypothetical scenarios taking place as of
01.01.2017. The two scenarios were specifically phrased as follows:
1. “Constant yield curve (static balance sheet assumption14 ): the yield curve
as of 31.12.2016 remains unchanged for the whole time horizon. The
static balance sheet assumption holds.”(BaFin/Bundesbank, 2017)
2. “+200 BP shock (static balance sheet assumption): the yield curve shifts
ad hoc and parallelly by 200 BP as of 01.01.2017 compared to 31.12.2016
and remains unchanged for the whole time horizon. The static balance
sheet assumption holds.” (BaFin/Bundesbank, 2017)
Because the upward shift in the yield curve is defined to be permanent
(BaFin/Bundesbank, 2017), the shock scenario by definition implies a contrac-
tionary monetary policy shock. It is verified that banks understand the shock
14For comparability reasons and to prevent implausible portfolio enhancements, banks were
required to replace maturing business with equivalent new business at prevailing standards
e.g. regarding probabilities of default of borrowers, contracted volumes and type of contract.
This is referred to as the static balance sheet assumption.
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to be permanent.15
To grant the highest possible adjustment in interest rates and to avoid that
old contracts confound our results, we focus exclusively on banks’ new busi-
ness. For loans, this is further divided into fixed and floating rate contracts.
For each scenario and bank, we then calculate the (new business) loan rate as a
volume-weighted average over fixed and floating rate contracts. This aims at
taking into account that banks with larger shares of fixed rate contracts might
change loan rates to a smaller extent. Because deposit rates are floating rates
only, volume-weighting is not necessary. Next, we calculate differences be-
tween banks’ reported interest rates for the shock and the constant scenario
(as outlined in Equation (2.3)) and normalise it by the size of the shock. For
each bank and category (i.e. loan and deposits), this gives a measure of the
pass-through of monetary policy to retail rates.
Provided that banks correctly assume di = 0, we observe price changes
conditional on an exogenous monetary policy shock which fulfils the criteria
of being able to disentangle supply from demand. Furthermore, due to the
particular way in which we calculate the pass-through of monetary policy, the
effect of any demand shocks which banks may potentially assume over the
course of 2017 is differenced out – as long as these demand shocks are unre-
lated to monetary policy. Similarly, any change in other factors, which mat-
ter for the pass-through (apart from monetary policy or demand shocks), that
banks might expect cancels out.
Banks are legally required to provide authentic results.16 In a quality as-
surance process, stress test submissions were continuously quality-checked to
ensure that all reporting banks submit meaningful data. Cross-checks with
reporting data (e.g. interest income and expenses or loan volumes) and peer
15Due to the permanent nature of the shock, all current and fixed assets have to be written
down.
16§ 6b KWG and EU Regulation No. 1093/2010 (European Parliament and Council, 2010)
apply.
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group comparisons ensure that reported data are plausible and fulfil quality
standards.17 Furthermore, banks were advised to submit revised versions in
case of poor or insufficient data. Data quality is of high importance because re-
sults provide the basis for individual (Pillar 2) capital guidance in the supervi-
sory review and evaluation process (SREP) framework.18 Remaining concerns
regarding data quality and authenticity will be addressed in detail below. In
particular, we provide evidence that survey responses are valid and unlikely to
be biased by strategic incentives which may be correlated with market power.
2.3.2 Panel data
We select and estimate explanatory variables from balances and profit and loss
accounts reported to the Bundesbank on a yearly basis. From this dataset, we
take control variables and, most importantly, compute measures for market
power. Because here we work on the entire population of financial institutions
in Germany, we explicitly take the “big banks”, i.e. SIs supervised by the ECB,
in the pool of competitors into account. We keep a long time horizon (from
1994 to 2016) in order to make sure we achieve plausible results of estimated
competition measures and their evolution over time. Due to mergers and ac-
quisitions, we work with an unbalanced panel.
2.3.3 Data cleansing
Before merging the panel and the stress test data, we clean the two data sets
separately. To exclude implausible bank-year observations in the panel data,
we drop observations with negative or zero total assets, equity and total loans
(i.e. sum of financial and non-financial loans) and impose the following condi-
17For instance, the maturing portion of a certain balance sheet position is compared across
banks with a similar average maturity in that portfolio.
18For more information, see https://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/
Veroeffentlichungen/EN/Fachartikel/2018/fa_bj_1807_
Risikotragfaehigkeit_en.html, viewed 25 February 2020.
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tions: loans-to-assets ratio and deposits-to-assets ratio must not exceed 1 and
0.98, respectively, and the equity-to-assets ratio must lie above 0.009 and below
0.5. The personnel expenses- and other administrative expenses-to-assets ratio
must be in a range of 0.0005 and 0.05 (Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2013). Before
we impose the latter two conditions, we winsorize the expense variables at the
upper and lower percentile (Kick et al., 2015). This leaves us with more than
54,200 bank-year observations.
From the stress test data, building societies (Bausparkassen) are excluded
as they are highly specialized. We furthermore exclude a handful of banks
which, despite the elaborated quality assurance process, still appear to have
provided data of insufficient quality. To deal with outliers, we winsorise in-
terest rate levels and pass-through variables (the difference between the rates
in the shock and the constant scenario, normalized by the size of the shock) at
the winsorised at the bottom 1st and the top 99th percentile of the respective
distribution. Finally, we only keep banks that pass the quality requirements
imposed on both datasets.
2.4 Measures of competition and concentration
To examine the effect of imperfect competition on interest rate levels and mon-
etary policy transmission, we use an individual pricing power and a market
concentration index.19 The Lerner Index is widely applied in the banking lit-
erature (Valverde and Fernandez, 2007; Berger et al., 2009; Kick and Prieto,
2014; Sääskilahti, 2016). In addition, it is to our best knowledge the only well-
known measure one can compute at the bank-level. Because the banks in our
sample operate locally, we also apply an aggregate concentration measure, the
19It has been established in the literature that various competition measures may be only
weakly interrelated (see e.g. Claessens and Laeven, 2004; Bikker et al., 2012 and citations
therein for empirical evidence, and Lapteacru (2014) for theoretical work) which calls for the
use of alternative measures.
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Herfindahl-Hirschman Index.20
2.4.1 Individual pricing power: Lerner Index
The Lerner Index (LI) measures a firm’s monopolistic power by measuring its









with average revenues calculated as a fraction of total revenues TORjt, to total
output Yjt, and marginal costs denoted byMCjt.21 We define TOR as revenues
that can be attributed to loan provision in a wider sense, excluding revenues
from financial transactions such as trading derivatives.22 In particular, total
revenues consist of interest income from credit and money market operations,
and revenues from fee-based business. Total output is commonly defined as
the sum of loans to non-financial customers (i.e. households and private firms),
inter-bank loans and securities (Mester, 1996).
To derive marginal costs, we estimate total costs for each bank in our sam-
ple using a translog cost function (Christensen et al., 1973).23 We follow the
literature and account for potential cost inefficiencies that make the optimiz-
ing agent (here banks) deviate from the optimal cost-minimum, e.g. through
suboptimal use of input factors. As stressed by Koetter et al. (2012), the LI
may be biased downwards if perfect efficiency is assumed. We do not impose
an assumption on why banks might operate inefficiently but we explicitly al-
20Alternative measures would be the Boone Indicator (Kick and Prieto, 2014), or the
Panzaar-Rosse H-Statistic. The latter has drawn much criticism in determining competition
(Bikker et al., 2012 and Shaffer and Spierdijk, 2015).
21Under imperfect competition the price P (Q) is equal to average revenues, i.e. P (Q) = AR,





with TORjt denoting total revenues
of bank j in year t, and TOC total costs.
22In a robustness check, we verified that including financial transactions does not make a
substantial difference in the results.
23A detailed derivation of a bank’s cost function can be found in Appendix 2.B.
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low them to act according to the quiet life hypothesis which states that market
power is negatively correlated with cost efficiency (Koetter and Vins, 2008).24
Total costs are thus estimated with maximum likelihood, in a stochastic fron-
tier model (Aigner et al., 1977; Meeusen and van Den Broeck, 1977; Greene,
2005).
Taking it to the data, we impose linear homogeneity of the total cost func-
tion with respect to input prices. Our functional form for the cost function






































































+ vj + uj (2.6)
where w1jt, w2jt and w3jt denote bank j′s input prices for loanable funds,
labour and fixed capital, respectively. Akin to Kick et al. (2015), we calcu-
late the input price for loanable funds as interest expenses divided by interest-
paying liabilities and for labour as the ratio of personnel expenses and the
number of full-time employee equivalents. Finally, we approximate capital ex-
penses by other administrative expenses to fixed assets. Yjt is as defined above.
We include a bank’s equity zjt to control for heterogeneity in total costs across
different bank sizes. Cross products between input prices and output with eq-
uity, respectively (η2, η3, θ), allow the effect of prices and output on total costs
to vary between smaller and larger banks. We also include a linear trend, tr,
single and squared, as well as interacted with input prices, output, and equity.
24Following Koetter (2013), we abstain from estimating profits before taxes taking into con-
sideration profit inefficiencies but rather take total revenues and output directly from the data.
See e.g. Kick et al. (2015) for an estimation of the LI with profit inefficiencies.
94
The error term of the cost function estimation consists of two components, vj ,
a random, i.i.d. term (vj ∼ N (0, σv)), and an inefficiency term uj for which
we assume an exponential distribution. Assuming that the two components
are independent, the above reduced-form model is estimated with maximum-





















Finally, one LI per bank and year can be calculated based on Equation (2.5).25
Figure 2.4.1 depicts the evolution of the average LI over time.
Figure 2.4.1: Evolution of average pricing power over time
Notes: The figure shows the unweighted mean of pricing power of all German banks over
time. Smaller values mean lower levels of average pricing power indicating higher competi-
tive pressure. Vertical red line in (i.e. at the end of) 2008.
While in the final analyses we only use the 2016 values, the graph can serve
as a plausibility check. Banks generally compete most severely for prices dur-
ing expansions and competition in various EMU states increased until 2008
after which trends reverted (Ruckes, 2004; Brämer et al., 2013). Our calcula-
25Summary statistics of all variables used or estimated in this section can be found in Ta-
ble 2.B.1 in Appendix 2.B.
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tions show that also in Germany, (price) competition rose in the boom years
leading up to the financial crash and reached its peak at the end of 2008.26
Lately, pricing power has been on the rise again, with average pricing power
reaching an unprecedented level on our scale from 1994 – 2016. Dynamics are
furthermore in line with earlier analyses for Germany (Koetter, 2013).
2.4.2 Market concentration: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
Structural indicators seek to derive the degree of competition from market
characteristics, because in strongly concentrated markets, firms should be able
to exert market power (Mason, 1939; Bain, 1956). The structure-conduct-performance
paradigm formulates that margins such as loan spreads are positively related to
concentration (Coccorese, 2009). However, few firms in a market might also
operate in strong competition to each other. Hence, the relationship between
individual pricing power and concentration is not trivial and we challenge our
estimations using these two alternative measures.
The Herfindhal-Hirschman Index which assigns a single value of concen-






where the sum of bank-level (j) local market shares (LMS) goes over all banks
that have their head quarter in administrative or urban district d.27 In a highly
concentrated market, the HHIpd approaches a value of 1. A bank j’s local mar-







26During that time, average revenues dropped while marginal costs rose on average, a trend
that reversed for both variables from 2009 onwards (see Figure 2.B.1 in Appendix 2.B).
27In 2016, Germany consists of 294 administrative districts and 107 urban districts, leading
to a total of 401.
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where the sum goes again over all i banks in a district; for Xp we alternatively
use deposits, loans to non-financial private customers and interbank loans.
Figure 2.4.2: Geographical variation of loan market concentration
Notes: The figure shows the HHI’s in the market for loans to private customers across the 401
counties (i.e. administrative and urban districts) in Germany in 2016. Dark red stands for low
level of concentration, dark green for high level of concentration.
Figure 2.4.2 shows the geographic variation in loan market concentration
across Germany in 2016. Markets tend to be more concentrated in the north-
east of Germany, meaning that there are cases in which one single bank is lo-
cated in a county (darkest green).28
Our approach suffers from shortcomings. When seeking to determine mar-
ket concentration in a bank’s relevant market, we assign the total value of de-
posits and loans to a bank’s head-quarter which reports balance sheet informa-
28Concentration in the loan and deposit market has been on a steady rise up until 2008 after
which it stagnated (but never fell). See Figure 2.B.2 in Appendix 2.B.
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tion to the Bundesbank. This implies the assumption that a bank conducts all
business within the district of its head-quarter. This should not lead to a bias
for savings and cooperative banks because they mostly report as separate en-
tities (i.e. head-quarters) and due to the regional principle are bound to operate
locally (Stolz and Wedow, 2011).29 However, it significantly biases results for
the big banks. If, for instance, a large private bank conducts business outside
of its head-quarter district in a region and market segment where a local sav-
ings bank operates, then our measure of concentration for the district in which
that savings bank is located is biased upwards. If, however, big banks compete
with the small and medium-sized banks in our sample only on specific, limited
markets, then the bias is limited, too. Many papers work with information on
branch locations to infer a clearer picture on market concentration (Kick and
Prieto, 2014; Drechsler et al., 2017). Information on branches in Germany is,
however, only reliably available until 2004. Furthermore, because data are not
available at the branch level, assumptions would have to be made to assign
shares of exposure to the various branches, leading to a different level of inse-
curity and lack of precision. We therefore desist from hand-collecting all bank
branches and instead run additional robustness tests below.
2.4.3 Competition and concentration
Panel A, B and C of Table 2.4.1 present summary statistics of district and bank
characteristics in 2016 for the banks that were part of the stress test. Panel D
looks at bank characteristics of the entire population of German banks over
the period 1994–2016. In panels A and B, we look at low-LI versus high-LI
districts, and low-HHIloans versus high-HHIloans districts with at least one bank
in 2016, respectively. Because the LI is bank-specific, we first calculate district-
29Because banks are only bound to operate locally when providing credit, the regional prin-
ciple does not necessarily hold for deposits. Due to the housebank-principle in Germany and
because the HHI for deposits is highly correlated with the HHI for loans, we still believe the
measure to be informative.
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level averages of the LI. We then divide the sample at the respective median of
the (district-level) LI and the HHI distribution. Column (I) furthermore only
presents data for banks for which a meaningful LI could be estimated.30
High-LI and high-HHI districts respectively have on average a smaller pop-
ulation in absolute terms and are characterised by a somewhat lower share of
individuals over the age of 65 (Panel A). High-HHI counties are furthermore
smaller while high-LI counties are on average larger. When averaging bank
characteristics at the county level, both high-LI and HHI counties exhibit banks
with on average higher return on assets and profits (Panel B). Similarly, high-
LI and HHI banks are more profitable (Panel C). Over the full time period,
when taking into account all banks (also the SI’s), that pattern is even more
pronounced (Panel D). Differences across the two measures of imperfect com-
petition arise when looking at the banks’ average exposure in the loan market:
high-LI banks and counties appear to have on average lower loan volumes
while high HHI banks and counties have higher loan volumes (Panels B and
C). Over the full time period, when taking into account all banks, both high LI
and HHI banks have smaller loan volumes (Panel D).31
Regarding volumes and market concentration, respectively, the pattern seems
to be similar to the banking market in the U.S. There, high HHI institutions
have larger portfolios regarding deposits (Drechsler et al., 2017).32 However,
high HHI counties in the U.S. are larger and have a higher population share
that is older than 65.
Summing up, county-level pricing power and market concentration are re-
lated in opposite ways to county size, and county-average and bank-level size
30In some occasions, the LI was negative or above one and we replaced these data entries
by missings in the analysis and exclude them for this section.
31Results are qualitatively similar when applying the HHI in the deposit market and split-
ting the samples analogously.
32Patterns in our data do not change when applying the HHI for deposits and relating that
to deposit volumes. Because the regional principle does not need to hold in the deposit market
in Germany, we focus on loan volumes and corresponding market concentration.
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Table 2.4.1: Descriptive statistics
(I) Lerner Index (II) Herfindahl Index
All Low LI High LI All Low HI High HI
Panel A: County characteristics (2016)
Popul. (in 1000) 210 235 185 210 265 156
Area (sq. km) 891 786 1000 891 995 791
Over 65 (%) 19.2 19.8 18.5 19.2 19.4 18.9
Obs. (counties) 385 192 192 385 192 192
Panel B: Bank characteristics by county (2016)
Profits (mill.) 2085 1859 2294 2011 1683 2343
ROA (%) 0.77 0.67 0.87 0.74 0.72 0.76
Loans (mill.) 921 1151 685 910 859 961
LI/HHI 0.37 0.32 0.42 0.547 0.36 0.74
Obs. (counties) 385 192 192 385 192 192
Panel C: Bank characteristics (2016)
Profits (mill.) 1,964 1,531 2,397 1,854 1,527 2,181
ROA (%) 0.77 0.60 0.94 0.72 0.007 0.75
Loans (mill.) 961 1307 615 960 886 1034
Deposits (mill.) 669 815 523 661 611 711
LI/HHI 0.37 0.29 0.45 0.43 0.28 0.58
Obs. (banks) 1,442 721 721 1,482 741 741
Panel D: Bank characteristics (all banks, 1994-2016)
Profits (mill.) 444 379 509 425 330 520
ROA (%) 1.0 0.68 1.3 0.86 0.91 0.81
Loans (mill.) 1116 1865 367 1261 1479 1042
LI/HHI 0.30 0.23 0.37 0.36 0.22 0.5
Obs. (bank x year) 51,565 25,782 25,782 54,228 27,114 27,114
Notes: Summary statistics at the county and bank x year level. Panels break the sample
into the median of the LI (I) and the HHI (II) distribution, respectively. All banks for
which a plausible LI (i.e. a number between 0 and 1) could be calculated are considered
for exercise (I) and only counties with at least one bank are considered for exercise (II). The
HHI is concentration in the market for loans to private customers. Return on assets (ROA)
is calculated as profits (i.e. the difference between total revenues and total costs) over total
assets and reported in millions of Euros. Loans are the yearly reported volumes for loans
to private customers in banks’ balance sheets, in millions of Euros. Sources: Bundesbank
supervisory data. Statistisches Bundesamt.
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of the loan portfolio, respectively (in 2016). However, both higher market con-
centration and higher pricing power seem to indicate higher profitability. This
is in line with both theory and previous empirical evidence on the relation-
ship between local market concentration and profits (Berger and Mester, 1997;
Pilloff and Rhoades, 2002).
2.4.4 Additional control variables
We control for several bank characteristics that might affect interest rate lev-
els, and potentially the pass-through of monetary policy. Equity financing is
associated with higher costs as opposed to external financing (Maudos and
De Guevara, 2004). Hence, we control for a bank’s leverage defined as the frac-
tion of total assets over equity and expect a negative relationship with loan rate
levels (Barattieri et al., 2016). On a similar note, De Graeve et al. (2007) find a
positive relationship between loan spreads and capital buffers since holding
equity is associated with costs e.g. in the form of forgone profit; thus, we con-
trol for excess capital over total assets, excess capital. We will furthermore use
this variable to test whether our results on imperfect competition are driven
by the fact that banks with more market power have a weaker incentive to
downplay the severity of the stress effect as they already hold larger capital
buffers. We also control for liquidity by including securities over total liabil-
ities, a variable which is important for the pass-through of monetary policy
shocks to credit volumes by banks (Kashyap and Stein, 2000). Monetary pol-
icy tightening aggravates liquidity constraints and therefore banks with lower
levels of liquidity tighten lending by more. De Graeve et al. (2007) furthermore
find that liquid banks have a lower pass-through. A bank’s funding structure
has been found to matter for its pass-trough of monetary policy (Weth, 2002;
De Graeve et al., 2007). We thus include the ratio of deposits to interest paying
liabilities to test its effect on the level of banks’ interest rates. Given the low in-
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terest environment and mostly negative EURIBOR rates in 2016, it is plausible
that our funding variable is positively associated with interest rate levels for
loans. Then again, deposits are a more stable source of funding (Hanson et al.,
2015) and banks relying more on deposit funding are found to be less vulner-
able to financial shocks (Jensen and Johannesen, 2017). Therefore, a negative
relationship between loan rates and deposit funding could also occur. We ex-
plicitly do not control for bank size in our estimations as it has been shown
that (in contrast to the U.S.) this is likely not to be adequate for the European
and, in particular, the German banking market (Ehrmann and Worms, 2001;
Worms, 2001). Due to the institutional structure of the German banking sys-
tem, bank size is not a good predictor for access to funds via e.g. the interbank
market. Small and medium sized banks mostly belong to the savings coop-
erative banks sector and are well interconnected within the respective sector
via their central institutions (Worms, 2001). However, we do not completely
abstract from potential heterogeneities related to bank size since we take it into
account when estimating marginal costs.
2.5 Analysis
This section discusses the relationship between imperfect competition and in-
terest rate levels and the pass-through of a monetary policy shock to loan and
deposit rates, respectively.
2.5.1 Summary statistics
Table 2.5.1 highlights asymmetries within banks across the pricing of their
products according to the 2017 low-interest-rate survey. Column (1) displays
averages and standard deviations for interest rates in the constant scenario,
irpconstant, representing retail rates for noted categories p which reporting banks
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would set in 2017 in the absence of a sudden change in monetary policy. In
that occasion, average loan rates would lie at 3.2 percent and rates for inter-
bank loans would be slightly negative. The average rate for deposits would be
zero. Column (2) provides average retail rates for the shock scenario, irpshock,
and column (3) the pass-through of the shock in percent, PT irp, calculated as
the difference between a bank’s interest rate in the shock and in the constant
scenario, normalised by the size of the shock. Following a 200 BP shock, banks
would on average pass on 78 percent of the shock corresponding to an increase
in loan rates by 1.57 percentage points. At the same time, banks would on av-
erage only offer higher deposit rates by 0.64 percentage points which implies
a pass-through of 32 percent, confirming a certain stickiness of deposit rates
in general (Hannan and Berger, 1991). Interest rates for interbank loans are
closest to market rates with a pass-through of 90 percent.






p Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Loans 3.20 0.95 4.77 0.94 78.42 15.5 1,466
Bank loans -0.025 0.30 1.79 0.46 90.24 19.56 1,433
Deposits 0.010 0.05 0.65 0.40 31.76 20.06 1,478
Notes: Summary statistics for interest rate levels and the pass-through for noted cate-
gories. Interest rate levels and the pass-through are winsorised at the bottom 1st and the
top 99th percentile of the distribution, respectively. In particular, Loans consist of loans
to non-financial customers which include all customers (such as households, firms and
public entities) except banks. Bankloans denote interbank loans. All variables to be inter-
preted in percent. Source: 2017 low-interest-rate survey (BaFin/Bundesbank).
2.5.2 Market power and interest rate levels
In this section, we examine the relationship between market concentration and
retail rate levels. Because the LI measures price setting power at the bank-
level, it is already implied by a bank’s interest rate level. To avoid endogeneity
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issues, we therefore only work with our structural measure of imperfect com-
petition and estimate at the bank-level j:





αmXjm + εj (I)
where irpj consists of 2017 interest rate levels (in percent) for different prod-
uct categories p. We control for ex-ante, i.e. 2016 values of all explanatory
variables, denoted by
∑M
m=2 Xjm, which we outlined in subsection 2.4.4. HHI
p
d
measures the concentration in the respective product market p in district d in
which a bank has its headquarter, equally measured in 2016. Our main focus
lies on interest rate levels in the constant scenario. To test the quality of the
survey data, we additionally run the same regression with retail rates from
the shock scenario as a dependent variable. The coefficient of interest is α1,
measuring the effect of market concentration on levels of interest rates.
We find that loan rates in both the constant and the shock scenario are on
average higher in more concentrated markets (columns 1 and 4 of Table 2.5.2).
Deposit rates do not vary significantly across different levels of concentration
in the absence of a policy contraction. This is likely to be the result of a long
period of low policy rates. However, after an increase in policy rates, interest
rates for deposits would on average be significantly lower in more concen-
trated markets (columns 3 and 6). These results are in line with the structure-
conduct-performance paradigm where imperfect competition on average im-
plies higher loan and lower deposit rates and are in line with previous analyses
on the U.S. and Europe (Hannan and Berger, 1991; Maudos and De Guevara,
2004).33 Because we do not control for borrower characteristics, our results for
loans to non-banks do not rule out relationship lending as formulated by Ra-
jan (1992) and Petersen and Rajan (1995). Accordingly, only for young firms
33Note that there is also work pointing at opposite results for interest margins in the EU
(Maudos and De Guevara, 2004) and corporate loan pricing in Germany (Fungáčová et al.,
2017).
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Table 2.5.2: Interest rates levels and market concentration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
irloans irbankloans irdeposits irloans irbankloans irdeposits







funding -0.28 -0.25∗ -0.032 -0.24 -0.12 0.27∗∗
(0.27) (0.13) (0.020) (0.23) (0.18) (0.13)
excess cap. 2.34∗ 0.060 -0.10 3.21∗∗ 0.080 -1.29∗∗∗
(1.42) (0.22) (0.073) (1.31) (0.35) (0.38)
liquidity 0.064 -0.0001∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.033 -0.000 -0.0001∗
(0.56) (0.0000) (0.000) (0.54) (0.0000) (0.00004)
leverage -0.032∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.0014 -0.029∗∗∗ -0.0006 -0.01∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.003) (0.0009) (0.0061) (0.005) (0.004)
Constant 3.48 0.12 0.051 5.015 1.87 0.88
(0.21) (0.14) (0.023) (0.18) (0.20) (0.15)
N 1466 1433 1478 1466 1433 1478
R2 0.0591 0.0181 0.0270 0.0569 0.0023 0.0514
Notes: Results from estimating specification (I). The dependent variables are interest rates
for noted categories and scenarios in percent, winsorised at the bottom 1st and the top
99th percentile of the distribution. In particular, Loans consist of loans to non-financial
customers which include all customers (such as households, firms and public entities)
except banks. Bankloans denote interbank loans. Standard errors clustered at the county
level in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Sources: Bundesbank supervisory
data & 2017 low-interest-rate survey (BaFin/Bundesbank).
with the lowest quality, credit is expected to be comparably cheaper in more
concentrated markets as a result of relationship lending. Provided that bor-
rower firms in our sample are e.g. on average rather old than young – or more
generally speaking, ongoing relationships as opposed to new ones prevail –
higher loan rates in more concentrated markets are in line with that theory.
This is because banks in imperfectly competitive markets can back-load inter-
est payments, making loan rates comparatively low only in the beginning of
the relationship. The market for interbank loans seems to be unaffected by
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local market concentration (columns 2 and 5).
Turning to the additional bank controls, despite low interbank lending rates,
the fraction of stable deposit funding (funding) is associated with lower loan
rates, as are lower shares of costly equity financing (leverage). As expected,
capital buffers (excess capital) translate into on average higher loan and lower
deposit rates. Effects of bank controls are furthermore largely consistent across
both scenarios. This can serve as an additional plausibility check for reported
rates in response to the hypothetical monetary policy shock.
2.5.3 Pass-through of monetary policy shocks
In our main analyses, we examine the transmission of monetary policy. Be-
cause the additional control variables (
∑M
m=2Xjm) should affect interest rate
levels in both scenarios in a similar way, their effects should cancel out in the
pass-through regression.
We examine whether banks’ pass-through is on average more or less com-
plete the higher their individually exerted market power or the more concen-
trated the market environment is by estimating:
PT irpj = α0 + α1LIj + εj (II)
PT irpj = α0 + α1HHI
p
d + εj (III)
where PT irpj denotes monetary policy transmission for bank j, calculated as
(irpj,shock − ir
p
j,const)/200BP for product category p. Coefficients are to be inter-
preted in percentage points (henceforth p.p.), where in both regressions α1 is
our coefficient of interest, telling us the direction of Equation (2.4). In (II), the
coefficient gives by how many p.p. the pass-through changes with a marginal
unit-increase in individual pricing power, measured by the Lerner Index, LIj ,
in 2016. In (III) we assess the analogous relationship between monetary pol-
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icy transmission and market concentration in the respective product market,
HHIpd , in 2016.
Table 2.5.3 provides estimation results according to specifications (II) and
(III) for loans to non-financial customers and for deposits.34 Columns (1) and
(2) consistently show that monetary policy transmission to loan rates signifi-
cantly falls in market power.
On average, a one-standard-deviation increase in the LI is associated with
a lower pass-through to loan rates by 1.06 p.p. or 0.068 standard deviations.
Furthermore, after an increase in banks’ marginal cost of funds, banks in more
concentrated markets ceteris paribus (henceforth c.p.) pass a smaller share of
the shock on (column (2)): a one-standard-deviation increase in concentration
on average leads to a lower pass-through by 1.17 p.p. or 0.075 standard devia-
tions.
After partialling out banks’ expectations of credit demand shifts that are or-
thogonal to the two scenarios, our results corroborate a relatively more incom-
plete pass-through to loan rates with rising levels of market power. If different
bank-level predictions of demand shifts between the baseline and the shock
scenario entirely drove our results, we would observe the opposite, namely a
larger pass-through with more market power: as discussed above, in the shock
scenario credit demand should be expected to contract more at banks with less
market power, c.p. making the pass-through relatively larger at more monop-
olistic banks. Thus, to the extent that banks do make these different demand
predictions, our results are likely to be a lower bound for the hampering effect
of market power on monetary policy transmission.
Doubts may furthermore arise because according to the instructions, all
banks have to replace maturing business with identical new business (static
34Neither bank-level pricing power nor market concentration matter significantly for the
pass-through of the monetary policy shock to interbank loan rates (see Table 2.C.2 in Appendix
2.C) and we therefore focus on loan rates for non-financial customers and deposit rates.
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Table 2.5.3: Pass-through of monetary policy and market power
(1) (2) (3) (4)







Constant 81.91 80.92 29.83 37.63
(1.79) (1.01) (2.53) (2.56)
N 1427 1466 1438 1478
R2 0.0047 0.0057 0.0006 0.0177
Notes: Results from estimating specification (II) and (III). The dependent variable is the
pass-through of the monetary policy shock to interest rates for noted categories in percent,
winsorised at the bottom 1st and the top 99th percentile of the distribution. In particular,
Loans consist of loans to non-financial customers which include all customers (such as
households, firms and public entities) except banks. Standard errors in parentheses, ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors are robust for columns (1) and (3), and
clustered at the county level for columns (2) and (4), respectively. Sources: Bundesbank
supervisory data & 2017 low-interest-rate survey (BaFin/Bundesbank).
balance sheet assumption). This inter alia implies that loan quantities are not
allowed to adjust, neither to the new market environment nor to the change
in prices. Hence, if high-market power banks consistently have higher loan
exposures, our results could be driven by these banks factoring in that they
would have to hold back on raising rates to keep up their high loan volumes.
The positive relationship between exposure and market concentration (HHI)
is indeed prevalent in our data (see Table 2.4.1). However, we have shown in
Table 2.4.1 that high-LI banks on average have lower loan exposures. The fact
that both indices still imply the same direction of imperfect competition on
the pass-through of the monetary policy shock to loan rates should therefore
mitigate this concern.
Results so far indicate that the supply side of credit mainly drives hin-
dered monetary policy transmission in imperfectly competitive banking mar-
kets. An analysis of within-bank heterogeneities can potentially provide fur-
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ther insights on the underlying mechanism by e.g. helping to understand po-
tential strategic bank behaviour. In particular, distorted competition in the
deposit market has been proven to be crucial for monetary policy transmis-
sion (Drechsler et al., 2017).35 The possibility to save expenses on their liability
sides may thus enable banks to smooth loan rates for their borrowers. Strong
ties between credit institutions and their customers could be the mechanism
which keeps depositors attached to their banks. Similarly, relationships could
then lead banks to smooth loan rates over the course of the match, insuring
borrowers against sudden shocks.
While individual pricing power does not seem to significantly affect the
sensitivity of deposit rates to a monetary policy contraction, market concen-
tration plays a substantial role (columns (3) and (4) of Table 2.5.3). On aver-
age, a one-standard-deviation increase in concentration leads to a lower pass-
through by 0.13 p.p or 0.133 standard deviations.36
To get a deeper understanding of the heterogeneities and magnitudes of
the coefficients, we calculate ceteris paribus effects from specifications (II) and
(III) at two different percentiles of the LI and HHI distributions, respectively.
That is, α1 ∗LI10th gives the c.p. effect of individual pricing power on the pass-
through for a bank with a LI at the 10th percentile of its distribution in 2016,
α1 ∗ LI90th analogously the effect of a bank with a price setting power at the
90th percentile. The logic carries through for the HHI. In response to a con-
tractionary monetary policy shock, a bank with a low price setting power c.p.
reduces monetary policy transmission to loan rates by 2.4 p.p. while at a bank
with a high LI this amounts to a reduction in the pass-through by 4.8 p.p., re-
35See also Sopp (2018) who builds a model where banks strategically use deposit rates to
smooth overall profits. In that set-up, deposit rates depend on a bank’s return on its loan
portfolio.
36In Table 2.C.3 in Appendix 2.C, we include the additional bank controls into the regres-
sions. Largely confirming our hypothesis, these seem to have no interaction effect with mone-
tary policy on our pass-through variables (in particular for loan rates) and the effect of imper-
fect competition remains robust throughout.
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spectively compared to a bank operating under perfect competition (first row
of Table 2.5.4). If a market is moderately concentrated, banks on average with-
hold 2.7 and 1.2 p.p. in the pass-through to deposit rates and loan rates, re-
spectively, and this amounts to 9.6 and 4.2 p.p. in highly concentrated markets
(second row of Table 2.5.4). Given an average pass-through to deposit rates of
30 percent, the effect on this market seems to be of substantial magnitude.
Table 2.5.4: Ceteris paribus effects for different percentiles of LI and HHI
(1) (2)
PT irloans PT irdeposits
LI10 LI90 LI10 LI90
- 2.4 - 4.8 - -
HHI10loans HHI90loans HHI10deposits HHI90deposits
- 1.2 - 4.2 - 2.7 - 9.6
Notes: Results from estimating specifications (II) and (III). LI10 is the value of the
LI at the 10th percentile of the sample distribution (in 2016), HHI10loans is the value
of the HHI in the loan market at the 10th percentile, that logic carries through for the
rest of the table. Source: Bundesbank supervisory data & 2017 low-interest-rate survey
(BaFin/Bundesbank).
Presented results indicate that the pass-through of monetary policy is ham-
pered by imperfect competition. Our estimations are in line with previous
work on actual interest rate responses to monetary policy shocks for both Eu-
rope (Van Leuvensteijn et al., 2013; Gropp et al., 2014) and Germany (Schlueter
et al., 2016).
We can provide suggestions for the driving mechanism. The reason could
lie in the shape of banks’ marginal cost curves (see section 2.2). It, however,
seems more likely that strategic bank behaviour motivates banks. That is,
banks operating in more imperfectly competitive markets withhold part of the
increase in interest rates from those who deposit savings with them and in turn
spare their borrowers a part of the general rise in funding costs. Sticky relation-
ships could promote that objective. Because interest payments of new matches
can be back-loaded in concentrated markets (Rajan, 1992), banks can more eas-
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ily form long-term relationships with their borrowers the more concentrated
the market is. While the two measures of imperfect competition seem to be
related in opposite ways to several county and bank characteristics, both in-
dicate that banks with higher market power have higher profits (in absolute
terms and measured as return on assets). In addition, our results are largely
consistent across the two measures of imperfect competition.37 Because banks
with market power on average charge higher than competitive loan rates and
subsequently do not pass positive interest rate shocks on to depositors, they
are likely to have the ability to absorb potential downside shocks to profits and
thus insure their borrowers against such movements in the policy rate. In do-
ing so, they also smooth their profits. Together with the housebank (or regional)
principle in Germany, this indicates that strong ties between credit institutions
and their customers could be the driving mechanism for our results.
2.6 Robustness of results
In the following section, we address potential concerns regarding strategically
biased survey responses and our measure of market concentration.
2.6.1 Biased survey responses
Despite extensive data quality checks, we need to mitigate concerns that a bias
due to strategic incentives correlated with market power drives our results. In
particular, the positive (but insignificant) effect of the LI for the pass-through
to deposit rates in combination with its significant negative effect for loan rates
(columns 1 and 3 of Table 2.5.3) may give rise to this hypothesis. Certain banks
(i.e. those with higher LI’s) could for some reason be less concerned about
37Despite the effect of individual market power (LI) being insignificant for the pass-through
to deposit rates, the positive sign of the coefficient may give rise to the concern that differential
strategic responses drive our results. We address this concern in the following robustness
analyses.
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the stress effect and therefore have reported a lower (higher), and thus more
accurate pass-through to loan (deposit) rates.
Banks are likely to seek to avoid consequences from the stress test results
which might curtail their leeway in conducting (lending) business, the most
obvious example being high excess capital requirements. From the stress test,
supervisors derive capital guidance which is higher the larger the resulting
stress effect (i.e. the difference between a bank’s interest incomes in the two
scenarios). Banks with already larger excess capital in 2016 are likely to be less
worried about the stress effect and thus might strategically report a smaller
and more accurate pass-through to loan rates and a relatively more complete
and truthful pass-through to deposit rates. If furthermore excess capital is sys-
tematically positively correlated with market power, our results in Table 2.5.3
could reflect these differential incentives.
Table 2.6.1: Correlations between capital buffers and market power
LI HHIloans HHIbank loans HHIdeposits
Capital buffer 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.06
Notes: Correlation between Lerner indices, market concentration (as measured by the
Herfindahl index) and capital buffers. Capital buffer is defined as excess capital (i.e. sur-
plus of T1 capital) over total assets. Source: Bundesbank supervisory data. Own calcula-
tions.
Indeed, banks with more pricing power tend to have slightly higher capi-
tal buffers while capital buffers and market concentration are barely correlated
(see Table 2.6.1). Note that higher capital buffers can indicate lower bank risk
and therefore this is also in line with our above narrative of a negative rela-
tionship between risk and market power.
Results in Table 2.6.2, however, indicate that the pass-through to loan rates
does not vary significantly with excess capital buffers of banks. Moreover, the
direction of the effect is opposite to what strategic behaviour would lead us to
expect: in line with work on realised interest rates, the pass-through to loan
rates, if anything, rises with costly excess capital (De Graeve et al., 2007). Sim-
112
Table 2.6.2: Pass-through to rates for loans and deposits in relation to capital
buffers
(1) (2) (3)
PT irloans PT irbank loans PT irdeposits
Capital buffer 23.84 0.43 -47.84∗∗∗
(17.50) (15.65) (15.87)
Constant 77.11 90.21 34.52
(1.06) (0.99) (0.98)
N 1,466 1,433 1,478
R2 0.0017 0.0000 0.0099
Notes: Results from regressing the different pass-through variables on excess capital. The
dependent variable is the pass-through of the monetary policy shock to interest rates for
noted categories in percent, winsorised at the bottom 1st and the top 99th percentile of the
distribution. Capital buffer is defined as excess capital over risk-weighted assets. Robust
standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Sources: Bundesbank
supervisory data & 2017 low-interest-rate survey (BaFin/Bundesbank).
ilarly, banks tend to withhold increases in deposit rates from their customers
the higher their ex-ante capital buffers are, which again falsifies a strategic bias.
This should rule out that our results could be driven by differential strategic
incentives to avoid additional capital guidance.38
2.6.2 Market concentration
Analyses regarding market concentration have hinged on the regional principle,
implying that banks mainly conduct business in the county in which they have
their head quarter. While this is likely to hold for loans provided by small
and medium-sized banks, it is problematic for larger banks. To mitigate this
concern, we run two types of robustness tests in this section.
We first exclude all SI’s which operate nationwide and calculate market
concentration solely based on the sample of small and medium sized banks
which are predominantly bound to operate locally.39 This exercise leaves our
38Note also that the effect of imperfect competition remains significant after we control for
ex-ante capital buffers, see Table 2.C.3 in Appendix 2.C.
39The new HHI’s are highly correlated to the old ones (with correlation coefficients above
0.95). Still, for 890 (153) and 843 (139) banks (counties) the HHIloans and the HHIdeposits
changes, respectively.
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main results qualitatively and quantitatively unchanged, both with and with-
out additional controls, and monetary policy transmission remains significantly
hampered in more concentrated markets (Table 2.6.3).
Table 2.6.3: Pass-through and market concentration based on small and
medium sized banks only
(1) (2) (3) (4)













Constant 80.76 76.14 37.84 41.20
(0.98) (4.27) (2.94) (6.75)
N 1466 1466 1478 1478
R2 0.0047 0.0092 0.0200 0.0534
Notes: Results from estimating specification (III). Market concentration is calculated
based on all small and medium sized banks only, i.e. large banks that operate nationwide
are excluded. The dependent variable is the pass-through of the monetary policy shock to
noted categories in percent, winsorised at the bottom 1st and the top 99th percentile of the
distribution. In particular, Loans consist of loans to non-financial customers which include
all customers (such as households, firms and public entities) except banks. Standard errors
clustered at the county level in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Sources:
Bundesbank supervisory data & 2017 low-interest-rate survey (BaFin/Bundesbank).
Second, we introduce a different and very simple proxy for the competitive
pressure in a bank’s surrounding area: we move away from bank data and
exploit that cities are usually both more densely populated and characterised
by higher bank penetration as well as better access to financial services in a
wider sense. For instance, outdoor advertising by online banks are likely to
be more present in cities as opposed to more suburban areas. Thus, we pro-
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mote that population density and competitive pressure on a bank in an area
are positively correlated and include population density (in 2016) instead of
the previous competition/concentration measures into (II)/(III). For that
purpose, we move to a more granular level and include population density
at the municipality-level into our estimation.
Table 2.6.4: Pass-through to interest rates for loans to non-financial customers
and deposits
(1) (2)
PT irloans PT irdeposits






Notes: Results from estimating (III) with municipality-level population density as mea-
sure for imperfect competition. The dependent variable is the pass-through of the mone-
tary policy shock to interest rates for noted categories in percent, winsorised at the bottom
1st and the top 99th percentile of the distribution. In particular, Loans consist of loans to
non-financial customers which include all customers (such as households, firms and pub-
lic entities) except banks. Population density is municipality-level population density in
1000’s of population per square kilometre. Standard errors clustered at the municipality
level in parenthesis, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Sources: 2017 low-interest-rate
survey (BaFin/Bundesbank) & Statistisches Bundesamt.
Table 2.6.4 confirms our results: more competitive pressure measured by
a more dense population increases monetary policy transmission to both loan
and deposit rates.40 Higher density by 1,000 people per square kilometre in a
municipality c.p. means a higher pass-through by 2.3 p.p. to loan rates and
3.2 p.p. to deposit rates. Coefficients are highly significant for loan rates but
only marginally significant for deposit rates.41 The latter could mirror that the
regional principle does not exist for the deposit market.42
40We also test the dependence of interest rate levels on population density and find that
loan rates in both scenarios are lower in more competitive markets as measured by higher
population density (Table 2.C.1).
41When we also include the additional bank controls, results are unchanged (Table 2.C.4 in
Appendix 2.C).
42Just as the LI and the HHI are no determinants of the pass-through to interbank loan rates,
population density has barely any influence (columns 5 and 6 of Table 2.C.2 in Appendix 2.C).
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2.7 Conclusion
The 2017 stress test covering all small and medium sized banks in Germany
provides us with an exceptional data set on the pass-through of monetary pol-
icy to various retail rates. Because the data delivers two data points per bank
for the same point in time, rates for after a hypothetical policy contraction and
in the absence thereof, we can to a large extent control for potential demand
shifts. We show that banks in imperfectly competitive markets charge higher
loan rates but pass on smaller fractions of the monetary policy tightening on
to their borrowers. At the same time, these banks raise deposit rates to a rela-
tively smaller extent. This strategic behaviour, coupled with higher profits of
market-power banks and the housebank principle of the German credit mar-
ket, leads us to conclude that banks in imperfectly competitive markets have
the capacity to build long-term relationships. Consequently, they seem to in-
sure their borrowers against adverse shocks – at the expense of their deposi-
tors.
Policy makers know that some degree of market power ensures financial
stability. We highlight that this, however, comes at the cost of monetary policy
being less effective. Because in boom phases which tend to precede financial
and economic turmoil, market power seems to generally rise, monetary policy
could be least effective when needed most.
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Appendix
2.A Derivations for conceptual framework
2.A.1 Proof of Equation (2.2)

















Consider the following functional forms for the curves in a standard IO
model with monopolistic competition, using common textbook notation:
Inverse demand is p(q) = i − bq with i, b > 0, marginal revenues are mr =
i − 2bq and marginal costs are mc = zq2 − yq + x with x, y, z > 0 and i > x.
Note, in a simpler version where marginal costs are linear, z = 0, x > 0, y < 0
or where marginal costs are constant, z = 0, x > 0, y = 0. Three parameters
are of particular interest here. First, the higher b, the steeper inverse demand
and the more market power a monopolist can exert by applying a mark-up
on marginal costs when setting the optimal price. The slope of demand is the




Second, the value of i determines the intercept of the inverse demand curve
with q = 0. An exogenous demand shock thus changes i and can be interpreted
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as the maximum price a (marginal) customer would be willing to pay (in the




Third, x is the intercept of the marginal cost curve and therefore a shock to
marginal costs changes x.
Profit maximisation leads to the equilibrium condition of mr = mc. As a










(2b− y)2 + 4z(i− x))
2z
> 0 (2.13)
When z = 0, y < 0
p∗ = i− b(i− x)
2b+ y
> 0
and p∗ = i − i−x
2





and q∗ = i−x
2b
, respectively.
The pass-trough of a cost shock to the price is derived as the change in the
price in response to a parallel shift in the curve of marginal costs, i.e. a change





(2b+ y)2 + 4z(i− x)
> 0 (2.14)
An increase in marginal costs results in an increase in the price. With z =








Note that the change in the equilibrium price depends on the slope of de-
mand and hence on the level of market power. If marginal costs are constant,
y = 0 and the pass-through simplifies to a constant, 1
2
.





(2b− y)2 + 4z(i− x)
< 0 (2.15)
Following a cost shock, the equilibrium quantity shrinks. Note, this is identical
to the total derivative dq
∗
di






In the case of constant marginal costs this simplifies to − 1
2b
.
Equations (2.10), (2.11), (2.15) are the components of Equation (2.2) when






















It is easy to see that this also holds true for the cases where marginal costs are
linear or constant.
The price change in response to a change in demand is derived by totally




(2b− y)2 + 4z(i− x)
A demand shock has a direct effect on the price which goes into the same
direction of the shock, ∂p
∂i




, which works in
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the opposite direction of the direct effect: in the case of a negative demand
shock, the direct effect pushes the equilibrium price down. However, the more
market power the monopolist has, i.e. the relatively less elastic demand (or the
steeper demand), the smaller the price reduction towards the new equilibrium.





In the case of constant marginal costs this simplifies to 1
2
.








(2b− y)2 + 4z(i− x)






In the case of constant marginal costs this simplifies to 1/2b.
The following derivation shows that dp
∗
di
is equivalent to the second part in










di = 1− b ∗ 1√





It is easy to see that this also holds true for the cases where marginal costs are
linear or constant.
2.A.2 Dependence of the pass-through on market power
The following Equation derives how the pass-through depends on the slope of





(2b− y)2 + 4z(i− x)
− b(8b− 4y)
2[(2b− y)2 + 4z(i− x)] 32
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=
y2 − 2by + 4iz − 4xz
[(2b+ y)2 + 4z(i− x)] 32
(2.18)










Intuitively, when demand is “steep enough”, the pass-through can fall in mar-
ket power. To be precise, as long as demand does not intersect marginal costs
in their increasing part of the curve, the pass-through falls in b.
Otherwise, the pass-through is larger the steeper demand, d(dp/dx)
db
> 0.








When marginal costs are constant, the pass-through does not depend on the
slope of demand. Note that in this model, a monotonic dependence of the
Lerner Index on b is always given for the linear version of marginal cost, while
it is a possible and plausible case in the quadratic model.
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2.B Theoretical background for marginal costs
In economic theory, banks fulfil an intermediary role, hence a bank’s financial
assets, i.e. loans (to customers and banks) as well as securities are considered
as its output. As inputs it is assumed that banks use labour, capital and loan-
able funds.
Following Clark (1984) we assume a (homogenous) Cobb-Douglas produc-








where Yj is bank j′s total output, Kj represents capital inputs, Lj labour
inputs and Fj loanable funds. While the choice of the functional form may
seem arbitrary, Clark (1984) discussed that the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas
production function does not appear to be inappropriate.
The cost function of bank j is given by
TOCj = pjKj + wiLj + riFj
where pj denotes bank j’s price of capital, wj the price of labour, and rj the
price of loanable funds. Total costs as a function of inputs and outputs can be
derived from minimising total costs with respect to the inputs, while having
the constraint of the production function:





Using the method of Lagrange multipliers, the first order conditions w.r.t.
labour, capital and funds, and the Lagrange multiplier λ are:




j ≡ 0 (2.19)




j ≡ 0 (2.20)
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j ≡ 0 (2.21)




j ≡ 0 (2.22)









































After plugging in the above expression for Lj , total costs can be written as a
function of output Yj , and input prices, wj, rj, pj
































































That translog cost function can be estimated from the data and marginal costs
derived from it as the first derivative of costs with respect to total output.
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Table 2.B.1: Summary statistics
variable N mean sd
Total costs, TOC 54228 1.12e+08 9.48e+08
Total revenues, TOR 54228 1.21e+08 9.35e+08
Total output, Y 54228 2.34e+09 1.93e+10
Interbank loans 54228 5.87e+08 6.64e+09
Loans to non-financial customers 54228 1.26e+09 9.50e+09
Securities 54228 4.90e+08 4.27e+09
Cost of fixed labour 52540 62258.81 168385.9
Cost of borrowed funds 54170 .286 57.864
Cost of fixed assets 54228 .243 13.328
Marginal costs, MC 52525 .048 .058
Lerner Index, LI 51565 .301 .092
Notes: Summary statistics over the full time period 1994-2016. Source: Bundes-
bank supervisory data. Own calculations.
Figure 2.B.1: Evolution of marginal costs and average revenues over time
Note: Unweighted mean of marginal costs and average revenues of all German banks over
time. Vertical red line in (i.e. at the end of) 2008.
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Figure 2.B.2: Evolution of average concentration over time
Note: The figure shows the unweighted mean of county-level concentration of all German
banks over time in the deposit (“Deposits”), loan (“Loans”) and interbank loan (“Loans CI”)
market, respectively. County reforms are taken into account.
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2.C Tables
Table 2.C.1: Interest rate levels and market concentration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
irloans irbank loans irdeposits irloans irbank loans irdeposits
constant constant constant shock shock shock
pop. dens. -0.34∗∗∗ 0.041 -0.0024 -0.29∗∗∗ 0.014 0.071∗
(0.043) (0.035) (0.0026) (0.038) (0.040) (0.036)
funding -0.18 -0.27∗∗ -0.031 -0.16 -0.13 0.24∗
(0.22) (0.13) (0.019) (0.20) (0.18) (0.13)
excess cap. 2.75∗ -0.057 -0.089 3.52∗∗∗ 0.009 -1.63∗∗∗
(1.43) (0.24) (0.065) (1.30) (0.38) (0.40)
liquidity 0.21 -0.0002∗∗∗ -0.000 0.097 -0.000 -0.0001∗
(0.43) (0.000) (0.000) (0.43) (0.000) (0.000)
leverage -0.025∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.001 -0.023∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.013∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.003) (0.0009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004)
Constant 3.74 0.098 0.054 5.22 1.86 0.79
(0.17) (0.11) (0.025) (0.19) (0.18) (0.12)
N 1455 1422 1467 1455 1422 1467
R2 0.1478 0.0309 0.0282 0.1259 0.0025 0.0621
Notes: Results from estimating specification (I) with municipality-level population den-
sity as only competition/concentration measure. The dependent variables interest rates
for noted categories and scenarios in percent, winsorised at the bottom 1st and the top
99th percentile of the distribution. Population density is municipality-level population
density in 1000’s of population per square kilometre. Standard errors clustered at the mu-
nicipality level in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Sources: Bundesbank
supervisory data & 2017 low-interest-rate survey (BaFin/Bundesbank). Statistisches Bun-
desamt.
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Table 2.C.2: Pass-through to rates for interbank loans
PT irbank loans





popul. dens. -1.098∗ -1.14∗
(0.59) (0.63)
funding 3.92 6.68 7.013
(4.89) (4.49) (4.53)
excess capital 2.46 -0.12 1.80
(18.95) (15.84) (16.03)
liquidity 0.004∗ 0.004∗∗ 0.0052∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0023)
leverage 0.004 -0.049 -0.033
(0.17) (0.17) (0.18)
Constant 88.84 87.09 89.86 87.67 91.05 88.14
(2.42) (5.33) (1.35) (4.35) (0.63) (4.31)
N 1398 1398 1433 1433 1422 1422
R2 0.0005 0.0015 0.0001 0.0027 0.0024 0.0054
Notes: Results from estimating specifications (II) and (III). The dependent variable is
the pass-through of the monetary policy shock to interest rates for interbank loans in per-
cent, winsorised at the bottom 1st and the top 99th percentile of the distribution. Standard
errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors are robust for
column (1) and (3), clustered at the county level for column (2) and (4), and clustered at
the municipality level for column (5) and (6). Sources: Bundesbank supervisory data &
2017 low-interest-rate survey (BaFin/Bundesbank). Statistisches Bundesamt.
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Table 2.C.3: Pass-through for loans to non-financials, and to deposits
(1) (2) (3) (4)







funding 1.638 2.118 14.64∗∗ 15.39∗∗
(3.98) (4.54) (6.20) (6.20)
excess capital 30.16 43.59∗∗ -72.18∗∗∗ -57.94∗∗∗
(24.24) (18.26) (16.81) (17.64)
liquidity -5.281 -3.102 -0.002 -0.004∗
(4.77) (2.14) (0.0019) (0.0020)
leverage 0.167 0.142 -0.467∗∗∗ -0.464∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15)
Constant 77.84 76.21 34.59 41.03
(4.11) (4.37) (5.25) (6.55)
N 1427 1466 1438 1478
R2 0.0100 0.0105 0.0393 0.0509
Notes: Results from estimating specification (II) and (III). The dependent variable
is the pass-through of the monetary policy shock to interest rates for noted categories
in percent, winsorised at the bottom 1st and the top 99th percentile of the distribution.
Standard errors in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard errors
are robust for columns (1), (3) and (5), and clustered at the county level for columns
(2), (4) and (6). Sources: Bundesbank supervisory data & 2017 low-interest-rate survey
(BaFin/Bundesbank).
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Table 2.C.4: Pass-through to rates for loans to non-financial customers and
deposits
(1) (2)
PT irloans PT irdeposits














Notes: Results from estimating (III) with municipality-level population density as only
competition/concentration measure. The dependent variable is the pass-through of the
monetary policy shock to interest rates for credit to non-financial customers in percent,
winsorised at the bottom 1st and the top 99th percentile of the distribution. Population
density is municipality-level population density in 1000’s of population per square kilo-
metre. Standard errors clustered at the municipality level in parentheses, ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Sources: Bundesbank supervisory data & 2017 low-interest-rate
survey (BaFin/Bundesbank). Statistisches Bundesamt.
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Chapter 3
A Model of Interactions between
Labour and Credit Markets
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I introduce borrowing into an otherwise standard Real Busi-
ness Cycle (RBC) model. Usually, firms need to pay inputs before they are able
to turn output from production into revenue. The result is a time mismatch
between cash-inflow and outflow and it is therefore realistic to assume that
firms require external funds to smooth these funding gaps. In addition, there
typically exists asymmetric information between borrower and lender, for in-
stance regarding the borrower’s productivity. Such frictions raise borrowing
costs above the risk-free interest rate and can affect responses of real variables
to aggregate shocks.
The aim of this paper is to highlight real effects which an incorporation
of financial frictions in the most simple way have. I study an extreme case in
which firms always need to borrow (at least part of) their payroll while they
only require labour input for production. In doing so, I examine whether a
model without capital accumulation of the firm can match the cyclicality of
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the external finance premium and the response of real variables to aggregate
shocks as observed in the data.
Evidently, the premium on external funds is counter-cyclical (Gomes et al.,
2003; Levin et al., 2004). It reflects that in good times, the risk of default
should be relatively low while in bad times, the premium rises with a rela-
tively higher probability of default. Furthermore, there seems to be consensus
in the empirical literature that the existence of debt amplifies real business cy-
cles. For instance, in the Great Recession, employment dropped to a larger
extent when firms were ex-ante more leveraged (Giroud and Mueller, 2017).
Similarly, regions experienced a deeper recession when residing households
were relatively more indebted before (Mian and Sufi, 2009, 2014).
Most theoretical papers find that financial frictions amplify responses of
real variables to productivity and monetary policy shocks (Bernanke et al.,
1999; Petrosky-Nadeau, 2014; Chugh, 2013). However, there are also models
in which incorporating credit market frictions have a dampening effect on im-
pulse responses (Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1998; Carlstrom et al., 2016; De Fiore
et al., 2011). Most of these models either contain capital accumulation of the
borrowing firm (Bernanke et al., 1999; Chugh, 2013; Carlstrom and Fuerst,
1998) and/or additional frictions in the labour market (Petrosky-Nadeau, 2014;
Chugh, 2013), thus reducing the tractability of interactions between (friction-
less) labour markets and borrowing constraints/financial frictions.
The general framework for the financial contract in the presented model
follows Bernanke et al. (1999): agency costs arise between a borrower and a
lender, leading to a premium on external funds. Similarly, I assume that a
firm borrows against its net worth which consists of earnings net of debt re-
payment, carried over from the previous period. In contrast to Bernanke et al.
(1999), I apply the mechanism to labour instead of capital, an assumption that
changes the definition of net worth substantially.
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I furthermore analyse two situations, one in which borrower and lender ob-
serve the aggregate state before forming a contract (intra-period contract) and
another in which a debt contract has already been negotiated once the aggre-
gate state changes (inter-period contract). The timing of the financial contract
has been found to be crucial especially for the cyclicality of the premium (Carl-
strom and Fuerst, 1998; De Fiore et al., 2011). For the two types of models, I
study the effects of an aggregate productivity shock i) on the cyclicality of the
premium on external funds and ii) on the response of real variables compared
to a frictionless model.
The version I present first, is closely related to Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998)
in which firms borrow their input bill in an intraperiod financial contract. My
model differs from theirs in various ways. In Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998),
firms borrow for both labour and capital and the definition of net worth is
based on a firm’s capital stock. In the my model, net worth is defined as operat-
ing profits (from employing labour) after loan repayment and reimbursement
of shareholders, a specification akin to Petrosky-Nadeau (2014) or De Fiore
et al. (2011). The household sector in the presented model is furthermore dif-
ferent from Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) insofar that households are neither
the lenders nor rent out capital. Furthermore, Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) as-
sume that firms are more impatient than households which results in the firm
borrowing from the latter. To ensure that firms always need to borrow and
can never accumulate enough assets to avoid external funding, I assume that
firms need to pay out a fraction of their returns to households at the end of
each period (Petrosky-Nadeau et al., 2018). Here, I furthermore diverge from
Bernanke et al. (1999) who assume that a fraction of firms dies at the end of
each period.
I find that with an intraperiod contract, the external finance premium un-
realistically co-moves with the business cycle. The result is akin to Carlstrom
132
and Fuerst (1998) and has been subject to debates and criticisms in the theo-
retical literature (Faia and Monacelli, 2007; De Fiore et al., 2011). In line with
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998), the incorporation of financial frictions further-
more dampens the response of real variables to an aggregate technology shock,
compared to an RBC model. In contrast to Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998), the re-
sponse of labour in my model is even negative for the first four quarters and
almost imperceptibly positive thereafter. I outline that this is due to the fact
that borrowing is too expensive and firms’ equity too unresponsive for firms
to be able to hire more labour.
I then change the timing of the financial contract to an interperiod contract.
The resulting version of the model is similar to De Fiore et al. (2011). How-
ever, monetary policy and government spending is absent in my model. This
changes households’ budget constraint. Most importantly, as my model is in
real terms, inflation does not influence the evolution of net worth.
Incorporating aggregate risk into the contract leads to the desired counter-
cyclical external finance premium. The rising wage, however, makes labour
more costly. At the same time, net worth still reacts sluggishly and small in
magnitude. As a result, the rise in labour and output is again muted. I dis-
cuss that as long as net worth does not rise sufficiently, amplification of real
variables cannot occur.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 3.2, I derive the intraperiod
financial contract in a partial equilibrium setting. In section 3.3, I define the
firm and household sector, derive aggregate net worth and the market clearing
conditions. In section 3.4, I discuss model simulations of the two versions of
contracts, i.e. intraperiod and interperiod, and elaborate differences in impulse
responses to a technology shock. I conclude in section 3.5.
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3.2 The financial contract
The economy is populated by a large number of small firms of mass unity.
The production function of firm i which uses labour as the only input factor in
period t, Nit, is
Yit = xitXtNit (3.1)
where Yit denotes output, determined by aggregate productivity, Xt, which
is exogenous and follows log(Xt) = ρX logXt−1 + εX , with 0 < ρX < 1, εX ∼
N (0, σ2X) , and a firm-specific idiosyncratic productivity, xit, which is distributed




log(x)) , from the continuous probability
distribution F (x), with density f(x), and with E(x) = 1.
In the beginning of a period firms observe the aggregate state and contact a
bank in order to borrow the payroll against their net worth, Ai,t−1 (which will
turn out to be pro-cyclical ).1 In that stage, the wage,Wt, of a worker is taken as
given. Since the labour market is perfectly competitive, the wage is identical
for all workers across all firms. Each firm has to get a loan, Bit, in order to pay
the wage bill. All of net worth can be used to pay wages and the remaining
gap in internal finances is filled externally:
Bit + Ai,t−1 = WtNit (3.2)
Following Bernanke et al. (1999), and as standard in the literature (e.g. in
Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) and De Fiore et al. (2011)), I assume there is free
entry into the lending market and that the credit market is perfectly compet-
itive. Each lender holds a portfolio of loan contracts. The idiosyncratic com-
ponent of a firm’s productivity is unknown to both a firm and its lender when
a credit contract is written. Furthermore, the realisation of it is private infor-
1I define the timing of a variable as reflecting the timing in which it is decided. For stock
variables the timing corresponds to the stock at the end of a period. This coincides with the
timing convention of the software Dynare, see e.g. Adjemian et al. (2011).
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mation to the firm. The optimal contract is risky debt in which liquidation
costs occur in the case of default (costly state verification model of Townsend
(1979)). Contracts are risky because there is risk of default.
The optimal contract is then (fully) characterised by Nit (which determines
borrowing), and a threshold value of idiosyncratic productivity, x̄it, which sep-
arates repayment from default. If xit > x̄it, a firm pays back its debt in full
gross of interest, an amount that was fixed in the contract, and keeps all the
output in excess of the contracted loan repayment.2 If xit < x̄it, a firm de-
faults and the lender confiscates all the output in which case the firm keeps
nothing. In the liquidation process, a bank needs to uncover the realisation of
idiosyncratic productivity which comes at a cost. In expectation, it is a frac-
tion µG(x̄it), defined as µ
∫ x̄it
0
xif(xi)dxi (where 0 < µ < 1), of total output.
Intuitively, a fraction of total output is burned when a bank liquidates a firm.
This is in line with De Fiore et al. (2011) whereas Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998)
assume that liquidation costs are proportional to input costs for labour and




where Rlt is the (risky) loan rate which lies above the (risk-free) real interest
rate in the economy. The cut-off is such that the firm is just able to repay the
loan plus promised interest (RHS), i.e. production (LHS) is just high enough
to cover total loan repayment.
The expected income of the lender from the contract is
(1− µ)E(xi|xi < x̄it)Pr(xi < x̄it)XtNit + Pr(xi ≥ x̄it)RltBit
where the first part reflects the share of final output in case of default which
2See Carlstrom et al. (2016) for a criticism and alternative model of state-contingent loan
repayment.
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is total realised output after the deduction of liquidation costs. The second
part is the fixed return in case of non-default: when idiosyncratic productivity
turns out to be high enough, the firm pays back the loan plus interest (which
is equivalent to x̄itXtNit, see Equation (3.3)). Now I will use that F (x̄it) =
Pr[xi < x̄it] is a continuous and once-differentiable cumulative distribution
function with F (0) = 0, i.e. F (x̄it) reflects the probability of default. Recall, f
is the probability density function of xit and hence, the expected income of the




xif(xi)dxiXtNit + (1− F (x̄it))RltBit







xif(xi)dxi + (1− F (x̄it))x̄it
}
XtNit (3.4)
By substituting out the loan rate, the expected income of the lender can be
written as a function of the cut-off. The share of the lender is increasing and
concave in the cut-off x̄it.3
The expected income of the borrower (i.e. a firm) is
E(xi|xi ≥ x̄it)Pr(xi ≥ x̄it)XtNit − x̄iPr(xi ≥ x̄it)RltBit
3The first derivative of the expected share of the lender is
g′(x̄it) = 1− F (x̄it)− µx̄itf(x̄it).
There exists a value for x̄it where the share of the lender reaches a maximum, g′(x̄it) = 0.
Bernanke et al. (1999) show that when attention is restricted to non-rationing equilibria the
contracted threshold lies below that value. Hence, the share of the lender is always increasing
in x̄it. The second derivative is negative for a log-normal:





xif(xi)dxiXtNit − (1− F (x̄it))RltBit
This is all the output in excess of the contracted threshold value of firm-specific
productivity less loan repayment which occurs with the non-default probabil-
ity of (1− F (x̄it)) > 0. As already mentioned, in case of default the firm is left




xif(xi)dxi − (1− F (x̄it))x̄it
}
XtNit (3.5)
The expected share of a firm deceases in the cut-off, e′(x̄it) = −(1−F (x̄it)) < 0.
Furthermore, e′′(x̄it) = f(x̄it) > 0.
The presented specifications highlight that when a firm is leveraged, output
is shared between the firm and the lender with the firm getting e(x̄it) of final




to agency costs, on average µ
∫ x̄it
0
xif(xi)dxi of total output is burned.
The participation constraint (PPC) of a lender is that its expected return on
the contract must equal the opportunity cost of giving out a loan:
g(x̄it)XtNit ≥ RtBit (3.6)
The lending market is characterised by perfect competition, hence the lender’s
opportunity cost is equal to the interest-paying size of the loan under the con-
tract where the relevant interest rate is the risk-free rate.
When the PPC is binding (which it always is as shown below) the (average)













An intuitive dynamic of the model becomes clear when taking the first deriva-
tive with respect to x̄it: a higher cut-off which is associated with a higher prob-
ability of default translates into a higher (average) loan rate4. Note, since loan
contracts are intra-period, Rt = 1.
In a CSV model an important assumption is that all agents are risk-neutral.
The financial contract is written after the aggregate shock is observed and re-
solved before a new shock could hit (intraperiod contract). Hence, unlike in
De Fiore et al. (2011), the financial contract is not exposed to aggregate risk.
Idiosyncratic risk is diversified away since each lender holds an entire portfo-
lio of loans (Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1998).
The optimal contract is given by the pair (x̄it, Nit) that solves
max
Nit,x̄it
e(x̄it)XtNit s.t. g(x̄it)XtNit ≥ WtNit − Ai,t−1
That is, the credit contract maximises the firm’s expected return in t subject to
the participation constraint of the lender (where Wt is taken as given). Because
next period’s net worth is just a fixed fraction of today’s profits, maximising
current profits must also maximise future net worth and hence future profits.
The first order conditions (FOC’s) are (with φit as Lagrange multiplier denoting
the shadow cost of relaxing the PPC)5:
(Nit) : e(x̄it)Xt + φit[g(x̄it)Xt −Wt] = 0 (3.8)
(x̄it) : e
′(x̄it)XtNit + φit[g





> 0 if g(x̄it)−x̄itg
′(x̄it)
(g(x̄it))2




xif(xi)dxi + (1− F (x̄it))x̄it > x̄it(1− F (x̄it)− µx̄itf(x̄it))




5The maximisation problem and resulting FOC’s solely differ from De Fiore et al. (2011) in
the notation and in the timing convention. I, however, present more detailed derivations, e.g.
the relationship between the loan rate and the threshold of idiosyncratic productivity.
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(φit) : g(x̄it)XtNit − (WtNit − Ai,t−1) = 0 (3.10)




= − −(1− F (x̄it))
1− F (x̄it)− µx̄itf(x̄it)
> 1, with6 φ′(x̄it) > 0. (3.11)
Equations (3.8) and (3.11) deliver a particular relationship between the (ag-
gregate) marginal product of labour, Xt, and the marginal cost of labour, Wt,







I call the ratio of average marginal productivity and marginal price of labour
Φt, the (marginal) return on labour expenditures. Thus, e(x̄it)XtNit or equiv-
alently e(x̄it)ΦtWtNit is the expected return that accrues to the firm after pro-
duction, payment of workers and loan repayment.
Furthermore, it follows from (3.11) that for a given x̄it there is a unique φit.
Consequently, not only the expected shares of the lender and the borrower but
also the shadow cost of relaxing the PPC, φit, depend only on x̄it and therefore
Φ is solely a function of x̄it.
If monitoring costs are zero (µ = 0), the multiplier on the constraint is one








is positive if e′(x̄it)g′′(x̄it) > e′′(x̄it)g′(x̄it). That is, if
−[1− F (x̄it)][−f(x̄it)− µ(f(x̄it) + x̄itf ′(x̄it))] > f(x̄it)[1− F (x̄it)− µx̄itf(x̄it)]
which holds because






into (3.12) it is easy to see that also the return on labour expenditures collapses
to one in the absence of liquidation costs. Hence, even though the labour mar-
ket may be characterised by perfect competition, the information asymmetry
in the financial market (which results in monitoring costs) affects the labour
market in a sense that marginal return and marginal cost of labour are un-
equal. Taking into account the production function, the wage will lie below its
marginal product.7 The result is in contrast to a standard RBC model where
the two labour market variables are equal. Similarly, in the presented model,
to increase labour input, it costs the firm the wage plus the change in agency
costs due to higher borrowing per worker (to be precise, per hour worked).

























This turns out to be equal to the shadow cost of relaxing the participation con-
straint, see Equation (3.13). First, since φ(x̄it) > 1, the expected gross return on
internal funds exceeds unity and consequently a firm will always invest all its
net worth into the contract (Carlstrom and Fuerst, 1998; Faia and Monacelli,
2007). As a result, the PPC is always binding. Second, the firm leverages each
unit of net worth into a project of size Φt
1−g(x̄it)Φt (in terms of value of final out-
7The consequence of this in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) is that a firm’s output needs to sell
at a mark-up which is equal to Φt, hence they call their model the “output model”.
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put) from which a firm expects to keep the share e(x̄it) (Carlstrom and Fuerst,
1998).
Rewriting Equation (3.15) gives the (optimal) ratio of labour expenditures









Note that according to the middle part of Equation (3.16), Ψ is a function of Φt
and x̄it. However, as shown in relation to Equation (3.12), x̄it can be written as
a function of Φt and hence the proportionality factor between labour expendi-
tures and net worth, Ψ, can be written as a function of the marginal return on
labour expenditures, Φt, only.
Consider two firms, firm A and B, where firm B’s net worth is double the
size of that of firm A. Equation (3.16) states that in this case, firm B simply gets
a loan that is double the size of firm A’s and can therefore finance a labour force
which is twice as large as that of firm A. The linear relationship between labour
expenditures and net worth stems from the assumption that the production
technology as well as monitoring costs are CRTS. The convenient consequence
is that it allows for aggregation.8
3.3 General equilibrium
In this section I embed the partial equilibrium contracting problem into an
otherwise standard RBC model.
3.3.1 The firm sector and aggregate net worth
It follows from aggregation that the entrepreneur’s financial condition is de-
termined by aggregate net worth. The aggregate stock of net worth is crucial
8It is worth mentioning that (as Bernanke et al. (1999) point out), in the prominent model
of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) the proportionality factor Ψ(.) = 1, whereas here labour expen-
ditures exceed net worth, i.e. the ratio is larger than unity.
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as it serves as collateral and determines the size of the loan that the firm can
get. Consequently, it drives the reaction of labour in response to a shock. Note,
only when net worth deviates from its steady state by the same percentage as
labour expenditures, the premium on external finance does not move and the
resulting dynamics are identical to a baseline RBC model.
I define the financial position of the economy analogously to Bernanke et al.
(1999) where net worth consists of earnings net of repayment of borrowings. In
contrast to Bernanke et al. (1999), earnings are a result from employing workers,
just as in De Fiore et al. (2011), just without government consumption which
does not play a crucial role in their model anyway. In doing so, I can com-
pletely abstract from capital in the model as opposed to e.g. Carlstrom and
Fuerst (1998) or Chugh (2013) in which cases net worth consists of (the market
value of) capital only. I will now return to the expected profit of the firm to




xf(x)dx− (1− F (x̄t))x̄t
}
XtNt
where I omit subscript i in order to move from firm-specific to aggregate vari-
able. Thus, Nt refers to aggregate labour.
Now, with the PPC (3.6) rewritten as













withBt referring to aggregate borrowing. This can be rewritten in a way that is
analogous to e.g. Bernanke et al. (1999) (where firms borrow for capital invest-
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WtNt−At−1 is default costs over (aggregate) loan size and is
an interpretation of the premium on external funds analogous to Bernanke
et al. (1999) or the spread between the loan and the deposit rate in De Fiore
et al. (2011). In contrast to Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) who make firms more
impatient than households or Bernanke et al. (1999) and De Fiore et al. (2011)
who assume that only a fraction of firms survives into the next period, I assume
that a fraction 1−ζ of net worth is paid out to households at the end of t and the
fraction ζ is carried over into the next period (e.g. Faia and Monacelli (2007)).
This assumption – just as all the other mentioned alternatives – rules out that
the firm can accumulate enough net worth but ensures that it always depends















This stock of net worth is carried into the next period. In other words, an
entrepreneur starts period t with net worth At−1 which was determined at the
end of t − 1 and thus before the aggregate shock in t evolves. Therefore, the
value of net worth at the beginning of period t is backward-looking rather than
forward-looking and the contract bears no aggregate risk.
The particular behaviour of net worth over the business cycle is again a
result of agency costs. In the absence of monitoring costs, when setting µ to
zero, it gives
At = ζ [XtNt −WtNt + At−1]
As shown above, in that case the marginal cost of labour would be equal to its
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(average) marginal product and therefore net worth would collapse to
At = ζAt−1
Hence, with a financial market characterised by asymmetric information,
net worth is essential for the dynamics of the model as it moves with the ag-
gregate state and determines the conditions a firm gets in the financial contract.
3.3.2 The household sector
The household sector is relatively standard and not directly affected by finan-
cial frictions. Unlike De Fiore et al. (2011), I abstract from money and deposits
which the household hold in their model.
There is a representative household with a continuum of members (of mass
one). Furthermore, the household consumes, can buy risky shares from a firm
and a risk-free bond (?). Its utility, denoted Ht, is:
Ht = max
Ct,Lt,χt
[U(Ct, Lt) + βEtHt+1] (3.20)
where I define U(Ct, Lt) = ln(Ct) + ξln(1 − Lt). Lt denotes hours worked
and time is normalised to 1, so leisure is 1 − Lt and χ is defined below. ξ
denotes the household’s weight on leisure. It is the Frisch elasticity of labour
supply, i.e. the elasticity of hours worked with respect to a change in the wage
(keeping the marginal utility of consumption fixed). Intuitively, a worker faces
some disutility of working. Here I closely follow common RBC models such
as in Jermann and Quadrini (2012).
The household optimises consumption, Ct, the fraction of risky shares χt
as well as labour supply, Lt when maximising utility subject to the following
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budget constraint:




The dividends a household receives lump-sum at the end of each period, Dt,
are included in the financial wealth, Πt. LetRΠt+1 ≡ χt(1+r
f
t+1)+(1−χt)(1+rt)
be the return on wealth where rt is the risk free interest rate known at the
beginning of period t and rft+1 the return on firm shares. Πt+1 is a random vari-
able. Note, all household members put their income together before choosing
per capita consumption and asset portfolio, hence the above constraint is an
aggregate budget constraint (Petrosky-Nadeau et al., 2018).






with Uc(Ct) = 1Ct as the marginal utility of consumption. The Euler equation






(1 + rt) (3.23)
It determines the risk-free interest rate. Firms’ and households’ optimization




Additionally, the first-order condition with respect to Lt determines labour
supply:
UL(Ct, Lt)− UC(Ct, Lt)Wt
!
= 0 (3.24)
Equation (3.24) outlines that households equate the marginal rate of substitu-
tion between leisure and consumption (i.e. UL(Ct,Lt)
UC(Ct,Lt)
) to the relative price of









In order to supply more labour, the worker demands a higher wage to be
compensated for the disutility associated with working. Hence, the labour
supply curve is upward-sloping in W with the slope equal to the Frisch elas-
ticity. Summing up, financial frictions do not directly affect a worker’s choice.
However, conditions in the financial market will do so indirectly via the wage
as will be shown below when dynamic responses are analysed.
3.3.3 Market clearing
To close the model, two market clearing conditions are required, one for the
labour market, stating that labour demand is equal to labour supply
Nt = Lt (3.26)
and – since goods cannot be transferred between periods – an aggregate re-
source constraint




where Yt = xtXtNt.
3.4 Model simulations
In the beginning of period t, a positive, autocorrelated aggregate productivity
shock hits the economy (upper left panel of Figure 3.4.1). As outlined above,
the threshold of idiosyncratic productivity, x̄, is crucial for the behaviour of
the (financial) variables. The upper left panel of Figure 3.4.2 depicts that in the
presented set-up with intraperiod financial contracts, the threshold rises on
impact. The underlying mechanism is the following. Because wages increase
with higher average marginal productivity, but net worth is predetermined,
the firm needs to increase borrowing (Figure 3.4.1). Debt contracts are formed
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Figure 3.4.1: Impulse responses to a positive technology shock with intra-
period financial contract
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Note: Borrowing for the wage bill with intraperiod borrowing. IRF’s show percentage devia-
tions from steady state in response to a positive technology shock. Correlation of the shock:
0.9; standard deviation: 0.01. Own simulations.
right after the aggregate state evolves. Thus, credit, in contrast to equity, can
respond on impact. As a result, the leverage ratio, i.e. borrowing relative to
internal funds, increases (lower right panel of Figure 3.4.1). This leads to a
rising bankruptcy threshold, mirroring an increasing probability of default, as
shown in Figure 3.4.2. Technically, the threshold needs to move to the right
in order to accommodate that firms’ idiosyncratic productivity is more likely
to fall below the threshold and default. Consequently, the premium for ex-
ternal funds, which moves in the direction of the threshold, is unrealistically
procyclical (Figure 3.4.1).9
Let the remaining panels of Figure 3.4.2 serve as a cross-check for the de-
rived relationships between bankruptcy threshold for idiosyncratic productiv-
9Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) also elaborate that in their model, this is due to the fact that
internal funds are fixed in the period of the shock. However, I will show below that it is
possible to achieve a counter-cyclical premium despite net worth being predetermined.
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ity and other variables introduced in the financial contract. The probability of
default is identical to the bankruptcy rate. Hence, with rising defaults, more
output is burnt in the liquidation process. Furthermore, the expected share of
output accruing to the firm, e(x̄), falls in the threshold and that of the bank
rises in x̄. As highlighted before, the loan rate, Rlt rises with the bankruptcy
threshold reflecting that a higher default probability leads to higher borrow-
ing costs.
Figure 3.4.2: Impulse responses to a positive technology shock with intrape-
riod financial contract
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Note: Borrowing for the wage bill with intraperiod borrowing. IRF’s show percentage devia-
tions from steady state in response to a positive technology shock. Correlation of the shock:
0.9; standard deviation: 0.01. Own simulations.
Financial frictions have an effect on the competitive labour market. They
drive a wedge between the (aggregate) marginal product and the marginal
cost of labour, which is mirrored in the rising return on labour (Figure 3.4.1).
This contrasts a standard RBC model where the return on labour is always one.
After a positive productivity shock, labour should rise.10 However, labour is
10To be precise, in a standard RBC model, labour would rise. There are other models in
which labour does not react to productivity shocks, for instance due to stabilising policies
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too expensive in the first couple of quarters: with wages and borrowing costs
going up, the levered firm cannot afford to increase labour. Moreover, net
worth rises sluggishly in the periods after the shock. Hence, labour only rises
once the premium on external funds and the loan rate fall below steady state.
This happens once the threshold of idiosyncratic productivity is below steady
state. Because the decrease in labour is quantitatively small, output rises on
impact but its response is muted compared to a standard RBC model where
output would follow the shock one-to-one. The sluggish response in net worth
furthermore generates some persistence in labour.
Note, in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) labour does not decline. Again, net
worth is the main driver. In their model, equity is based on the market value
(at the beginning of the period) of accumulated capital and rises to a larger
extent than in my model (2 percent compared to 0.02 percent).11 Thus, it seems
to rise sufficiently to allow labour to increase. However, because the response
in net worth in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) is relatively small, there is no am-
plification in real variables compared to an RBC model.12
Several other papers have worked with intraperiod financial contracts and
on a way to make the premium on external funds countercyclical. For instance,
Faia and Monacelli (2007) assume that the distribution of idiosyncratic pro-
ductivity shifts to the right after a positive aggregate technology shock. In-
tuitively, aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity are positively correlated in
their model. Apart from a countercyclical premium, this generates larger re-
sponses in real variables compared to Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998).
This mechanism can also be found in the search and matching (Mortensen
and Pissarides, 1994) literature: Chugh (2013) implement financial frictions
which are included into the model (De Fiore et al., 2011).
11Autocorrelation of the shock in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998) is higher than in the presented
model (0.95). This however does not affect the magnitude of the response in net worth.
12For instance, in Bernanke et al. (1999), net worth rises by more than 8 percent in the period
of the shock, see Figure 3.A.1 in Appendix 3.5.
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into an otherwise standard search and matching model and achieve amplifi-
cation of real variables (compared to a standard search and matching model
without financial frictions). In this model, firms need to borrow to create va-
cancies, and to pay wages and capital rental costs. It is worth emphasising
that both Faia and Monacelli (2007) and Chugh (2013) base net worth of the
borrowing firm on capital.
Amplification in the response of net worth as well as a countercyclical
premium on external funds, however, can also be generated without capital.
For instance, Petrosky-Nadeau (2014) present a search and matching model in
which firms need to borrow the costs of job creation (i.e. of filling a vacancy) in
an intraperiod financial contract. Their model generates a countercyclical pre-
mium on external funds and amplified responses in real variables, both due to
a large rise in net worth (Petrosky-Nadeau, 2014).13
3.4.1 Countercyclical premium on external funds
Another common way to ensure a countercyclical premium on external funds
is to introduce aggregate risk into the financial contract as in the original model
by Bernanke et al. (1999). That is, the financial contract is written before the ag-
gregate shock evolves. As opposed to the presented model above, a firm now
borrows funds at the end of period t− 1 for the use of labour for production in
period t. Hence, the contract is written before both aggregate and idiosyncratic
productivity become known to the firm. Thus, equation (3.2) changes to
Bi,t−1 + Ai,t−1 = WtNit (3.28)
13In Petrosky-Nadeau (2014), the premium on external funds is fixed in the period of the
shock and drops in period t+ 1 when predetermined net worth rises strongly.
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Equation 3.29 highlights that loan repayment is not state contingent but fixed
before the aggregate state evolves. The resulting model is akin to De Fiore et al.
(2011) with the main difference that my model is in real terms while theirs is
in nominal terms.14
Equation (3.28) together with equation (3.29) outline that in the period of
the shock, t, the response of the threshold of idiosyncratic productivity is de-












Total funds, Ai,t−1 +Bi,t−1, as well as the loan rate, Rlt−1 are predetermined and
cannot respond to the shock in t. Consequently, the threshold will move in the
opposite direction of the return on labour, Φt.
Figures 3.4.3 and 3.4.4 show impulse responses to the same positive aggre-
gate technology shock.
Similar to the version above, the return on labour rises on impact (Fig-
ure 3.4.3). As derived in Equation 3.30, the threshold of idiosyncratic produc-
tivity falls (Figure 3.4.4).
The intuition is simple. In the new setup, a firm cannot adjust the current
loan contract on impact but only at the end of the period for the use of funds
in the following period (”Borrowing” in Figure 3.4.3 depicts external funds at
the beginning of a period). Similarly, net worth available at the beginning of a
14I keep the household sector as derived above instead of following De Fiore et al. (2011).
This, however, only mildly changes the results quantitatively while qualitatively they are iden-
tical.
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Figure 3.4.3: Impulse responses to a positive technology shock with interpe-
riod financial contract
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e Internal over total funds
Note: Borrowing for the wage bill with interperiod borrowing. IRF’s show percentage devia-
tions from steady state in response to a positive technology shock. Correlation of the shock:
0.9; standard deviation: 0.01. Own simulations.
period responds with a delay, just as in the model above (Figure 3.4.3). Addi-
tionally, net worth rises to a larger extent than borrowing, i.e. the leverage ratio
now decreases (”Internal over total funds” in Figure 3.4.3 depict end of period
stocks). These two features translate into a falling threshold of idiosyncratic
productivity.
The opposite response of the bankruptcy threshold with respect to the model
above changes the remaining financial variables accordingly: the probability of
default and liquidation costs fall in response to the shock (Figure 3.4.4). This
can be considered as more realistic because in good times, bankruptcy rates
should fall. Thus, the loan over the real interest rate falls (Figure 3.4.4) and the
external finance premium is now countercyclical (Figure 3.4.3).
Again, wages rise with rising productivity (Figure 3.4.3) but funds take
one quarter to start increasing. Thus, labour falls sharply in the first quarter.
However, once funds are high enough, firms can built up labour input above
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Figure 3.4.4: Impulse responses to a positive technology shock with interpe-
riod financial contract
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Loan over real rate
Note: Borrowing for the wage bill with interperiod borrowing. IRF’s show percentage devia-
tions from steady state in response to a positive technology shock. Correlation of the shock:
0.9; Standard deviation: 0.01. Own simulations.
steady state. With net worth being less sluggish than in the previous version,
labour is above steady state already in the third quarter and the rise is larger
in magnitude. Furthermore, the model can generate hump-shaped responses
in real variables. These results are very similar to De Fiore et al. (2011).
However, the positive response in labour and output is still muted com-
pared to an RBC model. An important feature of the original model by Bernanke
et al. (1999) is that net worth rises by more than the underlying shock. This
stimulates investment (into capital) which raises its price, spurring on the
value of net worth further and thus creating amplification and persistence in
the response of real variables (see Figure 3.A.1 and 3.A.2 in Appendix 3.5).15
In contrast, this model (as the model presented above) lacks an amplified re-
15In the original model by Bernanke et al. (1999) this only occurs when the technology shock
is persistent with an autocorrelation of 1. Therefore, I also show IRF’s for a monetary policy
shock in Figure 3.A.2 in Appendix 3.5.
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sponse of net worth as well as significant persistence in the response of real
variables. Also in De Fiore et al. (2011), labour falls after a positive produc-
tivity shock. Inflation in their model induces a larger (and somewhat more
persistent) rise in net worth which results in larger (and more persistent) re-
sponses in real variables compared to the presented model (see Figure 3.A.3
in Appendix 3.5).
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I study interactions between a competitive labour market and
a credit market characterised by frictions following Bernanke et al. (1999). To
increase the tractability of the model, I completely abstract from capital. I start
with an intraperiod financial contract which implies that the aggregate state
is observed before borrower and lender form a contract and repayment takes
place at the end of the same period. In such a setup, credit spreads are unre-
alistically procyclical. I furthermore find a muted response in real variables to
a positive technology shock (compared to a standard RBC model). Introduc-
ing aggregate risk into the financial contract changes the behaviour of financial
variables: when credit contracts are written before the aggregate state evolves
and repayment takes place in the beginning of the following period, the pre-
mium on external funds is countercyclical. However, neither the model with
intraperiod nor the version with interperiod financial contracts create ampli-
fication in real variables. This is due to the fact that firms’ net worth rises
sluggishly. In contrast to the original model by Bernanke et al. (1999), finan-





Figure 3.A.1: Impulse responses to a positive technology shock in the model
of Bernanke et al. (1999)































































































Note: IRF’s of the original model by Bernanke et al. (1999). IRF’s show percentage deviations
from steady state in response to a positive technology shock. Correlation of the shock: 1; stan-
dard deviation: 0.01. Own simulations. Simulation code from Macroeconomic Model Data Base
https://www.macromodelbase.com/, viewed 5 June 2016.
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Figure 3.A.2: Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock in the model of
Bernanke et al. (1999)

























































































Note: IRF’s of the original model by Bernanke et al. (1999). IRF’s show percentage deviations from
steady state in response to an expansionary monetary policy shock. Correlation of the shock: 0.9; stan-
dard deviation: 0.000625. Own simulations. Simulation code from Macroeconomic Model Data Base.
https://www.macromodelbase.com/, viewed 5 June 2016.
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Figure 3.A.3: Impulse responses to a positive technology shock in the model
of De Fiore et al. (2011)
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e Loan over deposit rate
Note: Borrowing for the wage bill with interperiod borrowing. IRF’s show percentage devia-
tions from steady state in response to a positive technology shock. Correlation of the shock:
0.9; standard deviation: 0.01. Own simulations. Simulation code from Macroeconomic Model
Data Base https://www.macromodelbase.com/, viewed 12 May 2017.
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